Moral Disappointment

1 Moral Disappointment Maja Salibasic A thesis presented (submitted) for the degree of Bachelor of Philosophy Philosophy Department Stetson University December 2016 2 Moral Disappointment In this paper, I offer a theory of motivation, which I think describes the way our world operates with regard to human actions. While observing what I consider to be my ethical wish for how people should act (that people ought to act morally) and how that wish goes against the reality of their actions, I notice that there is a significant gap between my wish and my observations – and I am disappointed by it. The existence of such a gap is compounded by my realization that many are convinced that they are acting morally, when in fact, they are motivated by (nothing less than) self-interest. This is the source of my moral disappointment. This has ultimately led me to embrace Psychological Egoism as an explanatory mechanism of what drives and motivates people’s actions. I argue that the best explanation for our motivation is Psychological Egoism. But something being the best explanation for our motivation is not necessarily to approve of it. Thus, I do not defend egoism as an ethical theory, but rather I defend it as a descriptive empirical generalization about how people actually act and what motivates them to act. I have divided this paper into several sections. I start off with a brief introduction of what I believe human nature is (with regard to what motivates one to act) and that many people reject their nature. Next, I introduce the common understanding of altruism and selfless acts and how the adaptation of erroneous perceptions (which has been imposed on people through certain unjust social and political forces) have shaped our understanding of morality and the self to the exclusion of our own nature (with regard to motivation). I further clarify what is meant by the gap between the above mentioned ethical wish and observations. I then introduce the common understanding of egoism and clarify the difference between self-interested and selfish acts, as this understanding is essential for my further argumentation. I explain the relationship between 3 the concepts of altruism and egoism, which allows me to provide an insight into what I believe motivates human actions and what is meant by the title “Moral Disappointment.” I introduce two views of human behavior (the common understanding), that of psychological egoism and ethical egoism, which revolve around the above mentioned terms. Since the view of psychological egoism is the one I advocate in this paper, I further provide common objections to this view. Through the incorporation of modified understandings of the concepts of altruism and egoism, as well as their relationship, I then offer a modified version of psychological egoism. As indicated in the introductory paragraph, this paper offers a theory of motivation, which describes the way our world operates with regard to human actions. I therefore, conclude my paper by pointing out how psychological egoism, used as a descriptive empirical generalization, serves to define what – by nature – motivates human beings to act. In addition, the conclusion of my paper brings about a summary of all the major claims throughout the paper that explicate what human nature is, what kind of interest motivates human beings, and how and why it is morally disappointing to me. I: Human Nature – Does Self-Interest Always Win? As stated earlier, the intention of this paper is to provide a theory of motivation, which I think describes the way humans act. I believe that, since people are social beings by nature, it is natural that there is a constant conflict between one’s own interest and the interest of others when it comes to deciding what actions to take in certain situations. It is difficult to imagine a human being who does not have any interests in friends, or family, or any type of relationships with others. Social interactions, hence, ensure that we deal with conflicts between self-interest and the interest of others on a daily basis. However, despite one’s capability (and willingness) to take 4 into consideration the interests of others, I claim that human nature ensures self-interest to always win. The vast majority of individuals of any society are shaped to the fashion of the society’s culture with regards to various beliefs. In other words, most individuals are alike “plastic” to the molding force of the society in which they reside. Most people accept the forms and shapes that their cultures present. It is disappointing to me, however, to see how easily people accept such customs but hardly ever question them. It is also disappointing to see that many people reject self-interest as their strongest motivation for actions, claiming that it is actually the interest of others that determines our actions. Thus, I believe that people are being dishonest, to themselves and to others, by claiming this. It is, however, more plausible to me that one is capable of taking into consideration one’s own interest and the interests of others for one’s actions that are being pursued. However, I believe that human nature assures one’s own interest to always win. What is perceived as a seemingly selfless act, therefore, is not possible. This is the case because one’s own interest is being weighted with the interest of others. Just by doing so, it indicates that entirely selfless acts do not exist – there is always a self-interested thought or a kind of calculation of possible outcomes for oneself prior to every action. People’s inability to admit their own nature is what is disappointing to me. I am disappointed in the way people attempt to prove a “universal truth” regarding morality, whilst failing to accept their own nature and self-interested motives that determine one’s every action. Self-interest, therefore, in accordance to human nature, serves as the leading motivation for actions since it always wins, no matter the case. It is, however, apparent that there will be opposing views and obstacles to the theory that I hold for human motivation, which would put into question the plausibility of my claim. One might question the role of the interest of others 5 when it comes to making a decision for one’s upcoming actions. However, let us assume that the claim I make is plausible – which “proves” self-interest to be always involved in anything and every case we might take a look at – and we might end up asking if that is the same as saying that there is an absence of the interest of others? And my answer to that would be “no.” I am not saying that self-interest excludes considerations of the interest of others, rather I am saying that the two are in fact compatible – however, self-interest will always trump the interest of others. People do take into consideration others when deciding what actions to pursue. There is, of course, a difference in the amount of attention and care that one spends on thinking about possible outcomes of one’s actions on others or about the needs, wants, or desires, of others – such as of a parent, a child, a lover, a friend, or a stranger – but in each case, guess what will always come forward? It is one’s self-interest that will overcome the interest of others and serve as a determinant of the action that one will end up pursuing. II: Altruism – Are Selfless Acts Possible? The concept of altruism, as commonly understood, entails the making of some kind of personal sacrifice for the benefit or welfare of others. The terms unselfish, altruistic, and selfless acts are used to describe such “self-sacrificing” acts for the benefit of others. Here, I would like to point out that I will use the term “selflessness” or “selfless act” (for simplicity) when addressing such acts. Josh Clark, in his article Is There Such a Thing as a Truly Unselfish Act?, poses the question whether or not a truly selfless act, “one in which someone benefits while the person performing the act receives ‘nothing’ in return,” actually exists (Clark, 1) In order to carry out an answer, Clark focuses on a study conducted in 2006, which concentrated on anonymous charitable donations that people usually perceive as entirely “selfless” acts. All nineteen 6 participants were given money and had the choice of either keeping it or giving it away to a charity. The significance of this study is that those participants who did give away money to charities, similar to those who kept it, also received some kind of benefits – “the warm-fuzzies,” which was seen through certain brain activities on MRI images, interpreted as a good feeling (Clark, 2). Another similar research was conducted the following year to study the possibility of selfless acts. However, same patterns were seen, which led to the conclusion that “the brain that is activated when people analyze social bonds indicates that before we do something nice for someone else, we might first examine whether or not that person” is likely to act nicely to us in return (Clark, 2). Having this in mind, we might come to ask ourselves: why do we possess such traits? Clarke makes use of the Evolutionary theory to explain people’s behavior – a behavior that develops when humans help other living beings to survive. The study reveals that people cannot be seen as entirely selfless while performing seemingly “selfless acts” because of the “good feelings” they receive as a result. This is tied to our perception of others – we usually tend to perceive others to be alike us. The study also suggests that by identifying and comparing with others, we are more likely to take into consideration people’s likeliness to act “selfless” towards us, which serves as a justification to act the same way towards them – in order to receive certain benefits, such as emotional or materialistic support (Clark, 2). Through social interaction people acquire many learned habits and much of what they do is rather “automatized”. We learn to do it in certain situations, either simply by replicating those around us, or through explicit training. This is obviously true for skills such as reading, driving, or buying goods. However, it is also true for many of the expected behaviors in a society. For example, how far we stand away from someone when we are talking to them, certain dress 7 codes, or the way we portray certain emotions, all of these are learned behaviors that vary from one culture to another. To a great extent even “moral” behaviors are matters of this kind of learned habit. If the people in the neighborhood one grew up with automatically put their hand in their pocket when they pass a homeless person begging on the street, or when the plate for donations is passed around at church, one might start to act similarly. Some of this will be “self-conscious.” A person will think about how others perceive him or her, and will therefore, place much effort into fitting into the commonly accepted norms of behavior. It is often basic copying of the accepted behaviors. As a child, for example, one tried to compete with the behaviors of grown-ups. One’s motivation for this was not fear of their disapproval, but rather instinctive desire to master the codes of adulthood. Much of our “ethical” behavior will be unquestioned copying. There are many different models of moral norms that people can choose to accept. For example, people who go to the house of worship of their accepted religion usually look at other people and the amount of money they give away for donations in order to determine how much they will donate. It might also be the case that some people may decide to rebel against the people they live amongst. Some might find alternative peer-groups in books or on the internet that offer different models of moral norms. People can change their habits through reflecting on them. Anything that makes a habit explicit (anything from an unusual situation where it offers no guidance, to an inspiring book that challenges it) may provide an opportunity to question it and deliberately change one’s habits. Whenever we do something, whether it is donating money to those in need, volunteering for a cause, something as trivial, mundane and at the same time worthy of appreciation like giving up our seat for somebody else or doing our friend or colleague a favor, we do it because the deed strikes a chord within us. It makes some of us feel better about ourselves, helps us view 8 ourselves as morally and ethically groomed, as a contributing and valuable member of the society or simply strikes us as the right, and the only, thing to do. Some of us develop a charitable proclivity because the society expects it of us and to some of us these deeds present themselves as opportunities to leverage our act and position to gain something (equally or more) valuable in the future. It is also important to note that you can only be aware of yourself if you are aware of others. This means that we need society to identify ourselves, which means that being part of a well-functioning society is also in our interest. What is problematic is that people adapt and conform to social customs without questioning them, unwilling to confess such habits to ourselves. III: Morality and the Self James Rachels notes, in The Elements of Moral Philosophy, that most ethics is founded on a “self-other model” (Rachels, 53). Morality is about the duties we owe to other people and almost every system of morality recommends that we behave selflessly (Rachels, 53). In The Wisdom of the Egoist: The Moral and Political Implications of Valuing the Self, Jean Hampton also addresses this argument by pointing out that “moral action and moral regard are taken to be other-regarding,” which implies that morality is concerned, entirely or primarily, with our relations to others, especially with obligations that appear to require some sacrifice or compromise (Hampton, 21). This is because the traditional understanding of morality, which most contemporary moral philosophers adhere to, is taken for granted (Hampton, 21). This understanding serves as an account of the phenomenon of morality, with which moral philosophers attempt to provide a theory that would be considered either as a justification or as an explanation of morality. Hampton further expands on this point by articulating three prominent features that characterize the moral, as it is generally thought of to be. The aim of this 9 is to show how (what she articulates as) self-concern is, in fact, part of the realm of the moral, but also to demonstrate that value (around which moral theories revolve) is in the self – this view Hampton adopts from the egoist’s idea that the self is the carrier of value (Hampton, 47). To do this, Hampton challenges the first and third features of characterization, while arguing that “morality involves considerable self-interested concern, and is much more particular and personal in both content and motivation” than what is generally thought of it (Hampton, 22). While challenging these two features, the second feature (concerning the authority of morality) will consequently become less “personally threatening” as moral concerns would then encompass the well-being of others, as well as the well-being of the self (Hampton, 22). I am using Hampton’s argumentation to stress out the issue of rejecting self-interest as the leading motivation of people’s actions. The first feature of characterization is that “moral action and moral regard are taken to be other-regarding (Hampton, 21).” Hampton points out that “[w]hile some philosophers have identified a certain kind of self-respect as part of morality,” morality, in general, has been thought of to entail duties to others whilst demanding that they be treated with respect (Hampton, 21). This view, however, generally excludes self-interest from the domain of the moral. The second feature of characterization is that “morality is supposed to be highly authoritative,” which demands that in a conflict between reason that is derived from morality and any other sort of reason (particularly that of self-interest), the reasons derived from morality are considered to be the “rightful winner” in any case (Hampton, 21). The third feature of characterization is that “morality is supposed to be ‘impersonal’ (Hampton, 22).” This impersonality is explained in two ways – through the content and the responsiveness of morality. Hampton indicates that, generally, the content of morality is supposed to be impersonal, “whereas we care for our friends 10 or our family because we love things about them that are personal and distinctive to them, our moral attitudes toward people are supposed to be disengaged from the contingencies of their personalities, and responsive to something about them (e.g., their reason) that is common to all human beings (Hampton, 22).” It is further supposed that this responsiveness (as motivated by morality itself) is also impersonal, that is: “the moral worth of our actions is supposed to arise from the fact that we do them “for the sake of” duty, and not for the sake of some interest or affection we have that just happens to accord with moral demands (Hampton, 22).” However, Hampton explains that the issue of our inability to recognize the importance of our own interests lies predominantly in social and political forces, as they play a vital role in constructing our sense of self-worth (Hampton, 26). Unjust political structures (and people’s acceptance of such), can have such effects on people with regard to self-worth, which would make it impossible for them to effectively pursue their self-interests (Hampton, 22). Society greatly influences one’s perception of the self and that of others. This, of course, starts early on from childhood and continues to influence one up until the end of one’s earthly existence. The commonly accepted belief system of a particular society, with regards to values, customs, and norms (only to mention some), contributes to the formation of one’s sense of worth in accordance to oneself and others. As Hampton points out: “[w]hat actions one takes, what aims one develops, what ambitions one believes one is allowed to have, all depend upon the kind of worth one is prepared to accord to oneself and others (Hampton, 25). Although the pressure of social and political forces (by taking part in the construction of our sense of worth) greatly affects what interests a person will have and the sense of the importance of these interests, there is also a personal factor that plays a significant role in this. Despite the influence of social and political forces, “[e]ach of us has to choose the kind of worth 11 we wish to accord ourselves, and the kind of worth we are willing to fight to have others accord us (Hampton, 27).” What kind of worth one chooses to accept, however, generates what kind of attitude one will hold towards the self (Hampton, 30). I use this understanding of worth to further explain the meaning of the self. As Hampton claims, “we cannot try to define a self by exhaustively listing a set of traits that are taken to be necessary and sufficient for selfhood (Hampton, 43).” Rather, we need to understand that it is through our interactions with others that we come to learn what a self is (by interacting with selves). Hence, one is not moved by a certain “abstract moral principle or norm,” but rather by the value of the self – both rationally and emotionally (Hampton, 47). Egoism, as Hampton points out, offers us a “lesson,” so to speak, as it asserts “that our own selves are valuable” and that it is the self that moves us and not some abstract principle (Hampton, 48). It is however, through social interactions that we come to form certain commitments to others, which can be stronger or weaker, depending on the kinds of relationships we develop. These commitments, however, enable us to recognize value in other selves as well. In a way, commitments “force us to further interact with others and to confront the reality of another self,” which thereby helps “us to come to see this other person as mattering (Hampton, 48).” IV: Egoism – Distinction between Self-Interest and Selfishness The terms self-interest and selfishness are commonly identified as the same. However, I argue that there is a significant difference between selfishness and acting in one’s own interest. Contrary to common belief, selfishness and self-interest do not have the same meaning nor should they be used in the same connotation. People are usually under the impression that a selfish action is any action which has benefit for the individual who performs it, however, this is 12 not the case. Selfish actions are those which are concerned with one’s self to the exclusion of consideration of others. Benjamin Wallstein, in his essay Self-Interested Promotion: Defending Psychological Egoism, points out that we often tend to forget that “human beings – individuals of want and desire, prone to outbursts of irrationality – are by their very nature self-interested and incapable of going against their inner desires (Wallstein, 1).” What needs to be understood is that everyone acts for their self-interest, however, it is the extent of whether or not the interest of others it taken into account that differs from person to person. Here is where the term “selfishness” comes into play. Rachels suggests that self-interested behavior is selfish if it disregards the interests of others where their interests ought not to be ignored (Rachels, 61). The word selfishness is often times used to denote a class of behavior that is deemed anti-social in some sense. Most definitions of the word address some lack of consideration for others, in which we prioritize one’s own interests above the interests of others. People are usually under the impression that a selfish action is any action which has benefit for the individual who performs it, however, this is not the case. Selfish actions are those which are concerned with one’s self to the exclusion of consideration of others (Rachels, 61). Here, I would like to add that people are not “essentially” selfish, despite them always acting in self-interest. I claim, however, that people have the ability to choose if they want to take into consideration the value of other selves while making decisions upon which they will act. It is one’s rejection of the interest of others that condemns one’s action as being selfish. David Schmidtz in Self-Interest: What’s in it for me?, notes that “[t]he thing that normally worries us about self-interest, when it worries us, is that regard for oneself can crowd out regard for others” but also harm ourselves with regards to our flourishing (Schmidtz, 110). 13 Hampton’s claim about social and political forces (as having great effects on our perception of the self and its value) can be used to explain the phenomenon of selfishness. The world we live in may mold us into selfish beings (due to the constant exposure to erroneous perceptions of one’s relationship to other selves). Mostly what happens is that a person might be deceived to believe that he or she is of lesser or greater value when compared to another self – and it is difficult to resist to and reject such erroneous perception. People who choose to follow this type of perception of the self are prone to believe that selfless acts are of a rather naïve nature, which would go against the value of their self (as they have ascribed to themselves), and hence, would justify selfish acts as the way to go. However, self-interested acts do not exclude having benefits or some positive outcomes for others. Contrary to that belief, it is very likely that self-interested acts can be beneficial for the interests of others. This is the case because, as previously indicated, we are capable of taking into consideration the interests of others and possible outcomes there might be for both sides (that of oneself and that of others). It is also important to note, that one’s interest might very well be the welfare of someone else, such as can be seen in certain relationships (e.g., parent-child). V: Psychological Egoism Ramon Lemos, in Psychological Egoism, provides to us a common understanding of this view. It holds that every person’s act is done with the purpose of promoting what he or she perceives to be his or her own interest, be it welfare, pleasure, or happiness (Lemos, 540). Psychological egoism, traditionally understood as a doctrine of motivation, serves as a descriptive theory of the way people always behave – which is, that they seek and can only seek their own interest (Lemos, 540-541). 14 Joel Feinberg, in his essay Psychological Egoism, explicates two constitutional claims of psychological egoism: the claim that people are only capable of pursuing their own self-interest, and the claim that altruistic or selfless actions are not possible, except when they happen to be perceived as means to one’s own self-interest (Feinberg, 461-462). Feinberg clarifies psychological egoism, but devotes much of his essay to disproving a number of arguments that are in favor of this theory. It would be wrong to conclude from psychological egoism that one ought to act in one's self-interest, for psychological egoism only claims that people do act solely in their own self-interest, regardless of whether it is good or bad (Feinberg, 461). Feinberg claims that the thesis of psychological egoism is supposed to be a generalization about the way that people actually behave – something similar to saying that all swans are white (Feinberg, 462-463). This generalization is certainly false, because what falsifies it are the exceptions – black swans. Now, to say that all actions are selfish, he takes to be an empirical generalization – which is usually arrived at on the basis of observation. Thus, if this is in fact an empirical generalization, it should be falsifiable. His objection to the psychological egoism is that it is not falsifiable and hence it is not an empirical generalization at all, but simply a definition (Feinberg, 465). To say that it is a definition is to say that it has not been discovered by performing empirical research. The problem that Feinberg has with psychological egoism is that this concept does not enable us to find a falsifying thesis, which determines in advance that actions are selfish – making it contradicting its own claim of being an empirical generalization. VI: Ethical Egoism Feinberg clarifies that this theory is a prescriptive one, and as such holds that al people ought to pursue their own well-being, rather than that they are motivated by self-interested desires (Feinberg, 461). Lemos points out that ethical egoism does not presuppose psychological 15 egoism while also rejecting altruism (Lemos, 541). Ayn Rand, in The Virtue of Selfishness, advocates ethical egoism and provides certain examples that serve as an explanation for the plausibility of the theory. One of the examples is the case in which Rand distinguishes between an industrialists who produces a fortune and a robber who robs a bank. Although the motive behind both actions appear to be the same – self-interest – however, there is a certain difference present. The difference between the motivations of both agents lies in what they chose to value (Rand, 508). Rand also points out that an egoist works at becoming a better person by investing efforts in himself or herself (Rand, 508-509). Ethical egoism, over all, states that self-actualization is the ultimate goal of every human act through the pursuit of self-interest. VII: Objections to Psychological Egoism Let us consider some objections that Feinberg raises. He does talk about the argument in favor of psychological egoism and he talks about the pleasure argument and the satisfaction argument. So let us look at both of those. It is clear that people get pleasure out of doing whatever they do – otherwise why would they do it? We can also say the same for satisfaction – that is, people do what they want to do and when they do what they want to do, they feel satisfaction and they might feel pleasure. But here is a problem with that – we could claim that it is not doing what you want that makes it selfish, but rather what it is that you want to do which makes it selfish – it is not doing what I want but wanting to do what I do. Here we might say that the object of our want is the ground to distinguishing between selfishness and unselfishness. The mistake that the psychological egoism might make is thinking that just because you want it is selfish, but they forget that the object of the want is relevant – thus if people want to help others and are concerned about their welfare, we might say these people are unselfish and it does not make it selfish just because they want to help others. 16 However, when looking at this argument – that the wanting is not what makes the action selfish or unselfish, but it is what the object of the want is that makes the action selfish or unselfish – psychological egoism claims that there is no difference – because in both cases you are doing what you want and doing what you want makes it selfish. Here I would like to add that it is never the case that the interest and the welfare of others may overcome my own interest – my own interest is always going to overcome the welfare of others, because I am the creator of my interest no matter to what goal it is directed (be it to help others or to advance my own welfare) even though I let myself consider the others (I do not exclude them but in the end my interest will win). Now I am faced with a problem – is that true by definition that it will always win? The psychological egoist would then say that the self-interest is always going to win, and hence, defining that. Therefore, this is not in fact an empirical generalization about how people actually behave because people always do what they want to do and there cannot be any exception happening – I always do what I want to do, and that is by definition (we did not find out that people do what they want to do). Feinberg continues with his attack on the idea that all actions are simply means to a pleasurable end by bringing up various idiosyncrasies that he supposes disqualify psychological egoism’s original claim. He brings up the special cases of disinterested benevolence and disinterested malevolence in which he claims that proof of psychological egoism’s fallaciousness lies in the fact that we act sometimes with no end in sight or acting in such a way as to disregard our own interests for the sake of others’ interests and happiness. The simplest counter-argument is one that supposes I gain pleasure from pleasing others, and that I act in a benevolent manner in order to gain the pleasure associated with pleasing those around me. In no way do my actions indicate I had any motives in mind other than my own pleasure. As for cases of disinterested 17 malevolence, where I might reactively seek to cause others pain, I need only to say that the act of revenge (though, perhaps, not overly pleasing) is the pleasurable pursuit of one’s enemies in an attempt to hurt them. One gains pleasure by hurting others, and so acts accordingly. Another obstacle my claim is faced with is the inquiry of whether or not we are capable of deciding which interest will win in a conflict. Clearly it is the case that psychological egoism says that one is never free to let the interest of others overcome one’s own interest. It is a certain necessity for one’s interest to always overcome the interest of others. Here one might ask if I would go as far as claiming that I could not imagine a case where the interest in benefiting others will overcome the interest of benefiting oneself. My response to that would then be: “well, every time I try to think about circumstances in which both interests are at conflict, I come to realize that every person’s self-interest, also, benefits from seemingly selfless acts.” Clearly, I am not leaving any room for counterexamples as I am not allowing any case, regarding the conflict of interests, in which the interest of others overcomes one’s own interest, as I intend to elaborate further on one’s own benefit from seemingly selfless acts. To do so, I cannot simply rely on experience, as to say that I have never encountered an exception to my claim. However, I argue that I cannot possibly find an example in which the interest of others overcomes one’s own interest because it is human nature that determines self-interest to always win. VIII: Modification of Altruism and Egoism Altruism, as a concept, entails making personal sacrifice for the benefit of others. However, what many people fail to realize is that this kind of action is also serving one’s self-interest as we still gain something in return. Altruistic acts also serve for the achievement of other results – that is of what is in one’s self-interest. Taking into account what altruism as a concept represents – acting selflessly – we could look at altruism and egoism as opposite ends of 18 an imaginary scale. However, from the previous paragraphs we see that entirely selfless acts do not exist, meaning that such a depiction of the relationship between altruism and egoism – as opposing ends of a scale – is not possible. Altruism should then be seen as an element in one’s motivation for acting in self-interest, rather than as an entirely opposing end. We identify with many different roles in society and sometimes think that we need to live up to our roles – it becomes our interest to live up to them. Society puts pressure on us and we feel obliged to identify with certain roles, which we then might choose to do. However, by doing this, conflict is inevitable – each person wants to identify and assert himself or herself. It is because of the conflict between the self and other people from the very beginning of an individual’s life that we think we need to come to an agreement with others, which consequently means that in certain cases pursuing our best interest has to be sacrificed, but we can still pursue some sort of self-interest but with the notion of taking into consideration some interest of others. I therefore offer a modified meaning of altruism. As stated earlier in this paper, entirely selfless acts do not exist, since self-interest is always the most prominent motivation for actions. Thus, I propose a slightly modified meaning of altruism – that it serves to enable one’s self-interest while avoiding bad consequences for others (or at least tries to minimize them – be it for short term or long term purposes). From this we see that neither altruism nor egoism is entirely “pure,” that is, without the influence of the other. It is never the case that people act only altruistically, just as it is never the case that people act only in egoistic ways. Rather we are always motivated to act in self-interest but we are also capable of taking into consideration the interest of others and the possible impact our actions might have on others, which then might give altruism, a somewhat different task, which is to promote the establishment of some kind of agreement between ourselves and others 19 in a way in which we would still gain certain benefits and serve our self-interest, but others might gain benefits too. Therefore, it is important to note that we are capable of acting in self-interest while also having altruistic considerations, since benefit to the good of others can also have benefits to our own good, which ultimately might be in one’s interest. IX: Modification of Psychological Egoism Egoism of any variety lends itself easily to misunderstanding, which is why it is important that it should be formulated as carefully as possible. My belief is that (seemingly) selfless acts are also motivated by self-interest because of certain benefits that people might receive throughout the act or in return. In a way, we are serving our own interests while serving the interests of others. Hence, I argue that people always act in their self-interest, but this self-interest is one that they perceive because of motives they insist are the most persuasive. The nature of motivation is complex and we often fail to recognize that there is a difference between what a “neutral” third party might regard as inclusive of a person’s self-interest and what that person perceives as his or her self-interest. To answer the question of whether or not people always act in their self-interest, we have to accept that even though what might be deemed “self-interest” may be objective to the third party individual, but subjective in any case for the person whose actions are in question. What a person perceives to be his or her self-interest is not the same for everyone in identical circumstances. This is why I am offering a modified form of psychological egoism in order to clarify certain disputes. The claim of Glasgow, in Psychological Egoism, is that psychological egoists act in their best interest. However, I argue that one might take into consideration other people’s interests and still decide in their own interest (even if that requires some sort of sacrifice), but they are not always acting in their “best interest (Glasgow, 2).” Although acts similar to these ones might 20 seem to be selfless, they are not because one still acts to pursue some kind of self-interest – it does not have to be the pursue of one’s best interest, what matters is that it serves at least to some interest to oneself. To the individual, determining what is in his or her interest is a matter of exploring options and weighing the pros and cons of each option. We should readily admit that understanding which options we have to choose from is limited by how many options we can conjure with the knowledge that we have. This limit also hinders the process by which we judge the pros and cons of the decisions we have formulated. However, the part that makes this whole process of finding out what is in our self-interest subjective is when we stop to consider which pros and cons of each situation are the most persuasive. Some people believe that there are cases in which people end up acting against their own interest. However, here I would like to point out again that for each decision we make, there can be said to be pros and cons. And to each of us, these pros and cons will have different weights because we find some arguments and reasons more persuasive than others. For instance, let us take addiction to tobacco as an example. Some people might say that those who are addicted to tobacco are acting against their self-interest if they continue to consume this substance despite having knowledge about the negative health consequences. However, I do not agree with this statement. Rather, we should look at this in such a way that the person has chosen to continue smoking despite this realization because he or she is more persuaded by the need to satisfy the addiction than the need to maintain health. Conversely, if someone decided to stop smoking when they realized that doing so was unhealthy, it is because they are more persuaded to maintain health than to satisfy their addiction. When I say persuaded, I do not intend for it to come across as rationalizing an action. When I say that someone is more persuaded by some 21 reasons more than others, I mean to say that those reasons have more weight and more importance to the person than others. Conclusion This paper aimed to explain the gap that I notice between my ethical wish of how people should act (that they ought to act morally) and my observations of how my wish goes against the reality of people’s actions. As noted in my introductory part, this gap is the source of my disappointment. By offering a clarification of what is meant by this gap and by the notion of moral disappointment, this paper provides a theory of motivation, which describes the way our world operates with regard to human actions. I have defended egoism as a descriptive empirical generalization about how people actually act and what motivates them to act. I have embraced Psychological Egoism as an explanatory mechanism of what drives and motivates people’s actions. I am not implying that we should live this way, because if I did, I would then find myself defending and recommending ethical egoism. I would like to clarify, since I could not find an example of an entirely selfless act, my intention in this paper has not been to advocate an egoistic way of life. Although I have provided insight into how social and political forces may influence our perceptions of the self and other selves (which mostly lead one to pursue a selfish life – that of exclusion of the interest of others), I am not stating that it should be in our best interest to accompany this way of life. Because if I did, it would then imply that despite my disappointment in people’s inability to admit their nature, I would suggest that one should join them in their rejection (which can then be seen as advocating ethical egoism, while admitting the existence of selfless acts – as one would be left with the ability to choose their actions). Rather, the aim of this paper was to explain how self-interest, by our nature, is the greatest motivation of actions. 22 The aim was also to explain how people reject their own nature and try to deceive themselves and others in the contrary – that entirely selfless acts play a vital role in our actions. I have argued throughout the paper that the existence of the gap between my ethical wish and the reality of actions is compounded by my realization that many are convinced that they are acting morally, when in fact, they are motivated to the greatest extent by self-interest. To explain how this serves as the source of my moral disappointment I have introduced my understanding of human nature and how one’s actions are motivated. I also introduced the common understandings of altruism and egoism, as well as provided their modified versions, since I have come to realization that pure altruism and egoism do not exist. Existentially we are “self-interested” beings – however, capable of producing seemingly selfless acts, which should still be considered self-serving, since they were chosen and done by oneself. “Selfless” behavior may increase your social status, and this gives you personally many benefits, ranging from a higher possibility of receiving assistance when in need to a better selection of willing procreation partners. Selflessness never wins, and I am inclined to believe that because every “selfless” is done with an ulterior aim, which is to gain benefit or to avoid negative outcomes, be it physically, mentally, socially, or economically. This also depends on how we define altruism. If we interpret it as “selflessness with no emotional, physical, material benefit at all for the do-gooder,” then pure altruism is not possible (Clarke, 3). Humans have desires that are the triggers to their decision-making process. Some of those desires are for goods and services that are “rival” – in order for one to have them, others must not (that is similar to say that you and I cannot both have the same things). These desires are measured against other desires, such as for the approval of other human beings, a sense of fairness, and other. Actions are chosen based on an aggregation of these desires, and when the former regularly overcomes 23 the latter, we call it “self-serving” or acting for one’s own interest. Although we are capable of choosing our actions, we have no ability to choose which interest to put forward in our decision making – because it is by nature that self-interest will always win against the interest of others. Taking into consideration the interest of others is also an aspect that people can choose – as from this we can make a distinction between self-interested and selfish acts (based on our consideration of others). Seemingly altruistic behaviors can be reduced to and explained as basic self-interested behaviors. All behaviors, whether prosocial or antisocial, are self-serving in the sense that people do them because they want to do them on some level. People want to believe that there are pure altruistic motives and actions because they are in self-denial of how they truly operate – actions are done out of self-interest. Everything human beings decide to do arises from internal self-interested motivations, which vary from person to person. As I have advocated in this paper, we need to understand that there is always a mix between altruism and egoism and pure altruistic or egoistic acts do not exist. My incorporation of psychological egoism serves to further my argumentation by stating that in every case self-interest will overcome the interest of others. By claiming this, I also implied that it is not possible for self-interest to fail in any circumstance. One could even say that it is a somewhat “rigged” system that human nature has imposed on us and it cannot be broken. Despite our attempts to try and deceive ourselves that we have a say in what kind of interest wins, we actually do not. We are deceived in thinking that we sometimes act completely in the interest of others, and sometimes we go a step further and try to deceive others that we are letting their interests win against ours. This is where psychological egoism comes into play. When compared to ethical egoism (which is what we may choose to pursue or not), psychological egoism cannot be chosen. It rules out the ability to choose what type of interest will win in each conflict. Rather, 24 it is always the case that self-interest wins over the interest of others. We cannot choose and we cannot do otherwise – we are determined to be egoists by nature. We are caught into our nature and we cannot seem to shake it off. It might seem unpleasant but it is the way it is. 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