Morality: Emotivism, Valuations, and Propaganda

Senior Project Senior ProjectSenior ProjectSenior Project Senior ProjectSenior ProjectSenior Project Senior Project Morality: Emotivism, Valuations, and Propaganda Olivia Haskin PHILOSOPHY MAJOR Haskin 1 Table of Contents I. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 2 II. Emotivism ............................................................................................................................ 3 A. Stevenson ....................................................................................................................... 3 B. Hare ............................................................................................................................... 6 III. Moral Judgements and Propaganda ...................................................................................... 7 A. Use of Language ............................................................................................................. 8 B. Propagation of Preference and Persuasion ....................................................................10 IV. Basis for Discussion ..........................................................................................................11 A. Value Versus Fact ..........................................................................................................12 B. Contextual Shifting of Values Over Time ........................................................................13 V. Alasdair MacIntyre and Emotivism .........................................................................................14 A. Objection 1 .....................................................................................................................14 B. Objection 2 .....................................................................................................................15 C. Objection 3 .....................................................................................................................16 VI. Conclusion .......................................................................................................................16 Bibliography ...............................................................................................................................18 Haskin 2 Morality: Emotivism, Valuations, and Propaganda I. Introduction We want desperately to believe that we are ‘good’ and praiseworthy for the choices we make and the ‘vices’ we forego. It seems almost unthinkable to imagine a world without morals. However, when it comes time to decide on a moral framework to apply, we are woefully unprepared to agree on a universal scale. We differ nationally, culturally, and personally. Language behaves in such a manner that we are never able to completely understand or agree on what right and wrong are. For example, one would always say that cruelty is wrong. Multiple groups may agree to that concept. However, when one begins to ask each group or individual what qualifies as cruel, one will receive varying answers. What one group may construe as cruel, another group may laud it as morally praiseworthy. Although we have evolved a moral language with which to judge our actions and the actions of others, there are no moral facts. Moral values are concepts that we have developed over time to govern society and maintain its function. They are a method of control that we have created. They are not inherently true as a natural fact would be. If one were to make a moral judgement on a matter, it would not be automatically corroborated by the outside world or the current state of affairs. Contrastingly, if one were to make a statement of natural fact, it would not be subjectively true or false. It would simply be the state of the matter. For example, if I were to say, “The cat is shedding on the mat,” one would see a stark difference from saying, “That cat is bad for shedding on the mat.” One is a statement of fact, while the other is an evaluation of the cat’s behavior based on personal values. My view that ‘shedding is bad’ does not in fact make the cat bad for doing it. Haskin 3 My purpose here is not to argue the existence of morality, but rather to analyze its construction and purpose. Without it, society fails, if it can be called a society at all. The assumption that society was somehow an after effect of a preexisting morality presents flaws that are, under this paper’s view, explained by Emotivism. I do not wish to argue the existence of morality or its value, as it very clearly is necessitated by the formation and perpetuation of a functional society. The purpose of this paper is to propose an understanding of its origin and purpose. Through the course of this paper, I will assert that morality, and its language, are subjective valuations communicated as moral propaganda. II. Emotivism To begin, I will address and explicate some of the main points of Emotivism from Hare and Stevenson. Emotivism is an ethical framework that interprets moral statements as valuations or actionable prescriptions, rather than as fact. “The reason why actions are in a peculiar way revelatory of moral principles is that the function of moral principles is to guide conduct” (Hare 1952). I will be using emotivism throughout this paper to support my assertion about the nature of morality and the use of moral language. A. Stevenson In moral discussions and theories, there is always some kind of ‘disagreement.’ “The difference between the two senses of "disagreement" is essentially this: the first involves an opposition of beliefs, both of which cannot be true, and the second involves an opposition of attitudes, both of which cannot be satisfied” (Stevenson, Facts and Values: Studies in Ethical Analysis 1963). However, when discussing moral theory, he believes that the disagreement is not over belief or attitude, but over belief about Haskin 4 attitudes. “Both disagreement in attitude and disagreement in belief are involved, but the former predominates in that (1) it determines what sort of disagreement in belief is relevantly disputed in a given ethical argument, and (2) it determines by its continued presence or its resolution whether or not the argument has been settled” (Stevenson, Facts and Values: Studies in Ethical Analysis 1963). A way of interpreting belief versus attitude is to translate it into moral terms; it becomes what is right or wrong versus what is good or bad. Combining the two is where moral discussion takes place. When one is attempting to relate a moral topic to another person, one is expressing their belief about an attitude. For example, Stevenson gives an example of union workers arguing for a pay raise from their employers who do not wish to give it. “The union is for higher wages; the company is against them, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain unchanged. In addition to this disagreement in attitude, of course, the argument may represent no little disagreement in belief. Perhaps the parties disagree about how much the cost of living has risen and how much the workers are suffering under the present wage scale. Or perhaps they disagree about the company's earnings and the extent to which the company could raise wages and still operate at a profit. Like any typical ethical argument, then, this argument involves both disagreement in attitude and disagreement in belief” (Stevenson, Facts and Values: Studies in Ethical Analysis 1963). The attitudes of the parties involved, the views of what is good or bad, decides what beliefs will be relevant to the discussion and what must be resolved. However, on either side, one cannot be said to be ultimately right or wrong. The views of both sides are valid to what they prefer and give precedence to as being desirable. Their attitudes are also Haskin 5 deeply dependent on their experiences and culture. What the union workers might see as being unfair, the company sees as good business and profit. Another factor that one must consider in disagreements is the claimed intrinsic value of what is ‘good.’ When something is said to be “intrinsically good,” it is implied to be ‘good in itself,’ thereby precluding any discussion as to the nature of the thing beyond that it is good. “Its descriptive meaning may be defined, though not without the complications of ambiguity and vagueness that will later concern us; but its emotive meaning cannot accurately be preserved in this way, and must be characterized” (Stevenson, Ethics and Language 1944). How do we value something as intrinsically good, though? If something is intrinsically good, then one would think it must be right and morally praiseworthy. After all, if it is good in itself, then it defies justification. Or perhaps, rather, we decide to dismiss the attempt to justify the thing. It serves our purposes not to break the thing down into why it is ‘good’. Perhaps if we were to make a real effort to see what makes the thing good in itself, or what ‘good in itself’ truly means, we would find that we have no basis for that claim other than that we desire it to be so. “…[W]e may now say that ‘X is intrinsically good’ asserts that the speaker approves of X intrinsically, and acts emotively to make the hearer or hearers likewise approve of it intrinsically” (Stevenson, Ethics and Language 1944). Claiming that a thing is intrinsically good is just a preemptive strike at the demand for justification and analysis. Haskin 6 B. Hare Moral language is used as a means of instruction and control with which to govern society. One cannot create any system without being able to effectively communicate its terms and values. “The only instrument which the parent possesses is moral education–the teaching of principles by example and precept, backed up by chastisement and other more up-to-date psychological methods” (Hare 1952). We teach a system of moral values to the younger generation that they either accept or reject. They then adapt those systems to their own preferences and continue the cycle with the next generation. “Morality regains its vigour when ordinary people have learnt afresh to decide for themselves what principles to live by, and more especially what principles to teach their children” (Hare 1952). Once a person reaches an understanding of themselves and their environment, they can choose which moral principles they prefer, or suit their preferences, and what they wish to impart to their young. The cycle, as it continues, accounts for the shifts throughout moral history and the discrepancies between moral frameworks. But how does one impart their moral values? By discussion and with reasons – certainly – but also with behavior. We model our behavior after those around us. In order to truly influence and convince others that ours is the ‘right’ morality, we must really think that it is and behave accordingly. “To maintain an attitude of ‘moral approval’ towards a certain practice is to have a disposition to think, on the appropriate occasions, that it is right; or if ‘think’ itself is a dispositional word, it is simply to think that it is right; and our thinking that it is right may be betrayed or exhibited–behaviorists would say constituted–by our acting in certain ways” (Hare 1952). Consider an instance of the Haskin 7 ‘do as I say and not as I do’ variety. Perhaps a parent exhibits reckless driving behaviors; however, they are very critical of other people who drive the same way and they condemn their children for driving that way. Even though they verbally condemn it, they reinforce the opposite by continuing to do as they please contrary to their expressed beliefs. III. Moral Judgements and Propaganda Whether one refers to it as social conditioning or persuasion, there is an intent by those using moral judgements to convince. When claiming something to be good or an action to be right, we are not only displaying our preference, we are attempting to persuade others that our judgement is the right judgement and the judgement they should have. “…[I]n fact the suggestion, that the function of moral judgements was to persuade, [leads] to a difficulty distinguishing their function from that of propaganda” (Hare 1952). Propaganda usually functions as a means of radical persuasion. For example, the Nazis used propaganda tactics to demonize the Jewish population by associating them with poisonous mushrooms1 and meat2. However, even with its extremist message, the stories are expressing the moral judgements of the author. Also, he is attempting to influence the moral judgements of those who read the stories. “When we commend or condemn anything, it is always in order to, at least indirectly, to guide choices, our own or other people’s, now or in the 1 Ernst Heimer, Der Giftpilz (Germany: Julius Streicher, 1938); a children’s book that contained short stories that was pointedly anti-Semitic. 2 Buscemi, Francesco. "Edible lies: How Nazi propaganda represented meat to demonize the Jews." Media, War & Conflict 9, no. 2 (August 2016): 180-197. Communication & Mass Media Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed November 20, 2016). Haskin 8 future” (Hare 1952). Regardless of the extremity of the method, whether a basic conversation or an elaborate media based system, moral judgements and propaganda do the same work. By actively expressing a judgement of something, we are attempting to change or perpetuate our own views and the views of those around us. It is not so different an aim from moralists. “In ordinary usage neither term is emotively neutral, ‘propagandist’ carrying a stigma, and ‘moralist’ a note of comparative respect” (Stevenson, Ethics and Language 1944). It is understandable that a moralist would not want to be associated with a propagandist because they would lose that ‘note of respect’ and gain the stigma. “Those whom we call ‘moralists’ [are] praised or tolerated, and those whom we call ‘propagandists’ [are] condemned” (Stevenson, Ethics and Language 1944). One’s position becomes more precarious when one’s target is aware of the mission and associates a preconceived judgement with the speaker. In distinguishing the two concepts from each other, they must be defined in a manner that can somehow manage to disentangle them. In many senses, their definitions and usages seem to overlap or play opposites. “In any narrow definition, then, there is the likelihood that ‘propaganda’ will be made to designate what most people despise or fear, and ‘moralist’ the opposite” (Stevenson, Ethics and Language 1944). The language itself here seems to extol a type of valuation, or at least have an associated valuation, much as cruelty is associated with pain and wrongness. A. Use of Language With this idea of propaganda, let us return to the idea of ‘good.’ “The word ‘good’ has often been defined in terms of approval, or similar psychological attitudes. We Haskin 9 may take as typical examples: ‘good’ means desired by me (Hobbes); and ‘good’ means approved by most people (Hume, in effect)” (Stevenson, Facts and Values: Studies in Ethical Analysis 1963). Even so, there are issues with both definitions. “To teach what makes a member of any class a good member of the class is indeed a new lesson for each class of objects; but nevertheless the word ‘good’ has a constant meaning which, once learnt, can be understood no matter which class of objects is being discussed” (Hare 1952). While the overt definition of ‘good’ may be difficult to pin down morally, it is a shared concept that seems universally understood. I have stated previously that it was not my purpose to dispute the existence or use of a common understanding of “moral good,” but rather to look at how it is used. According to Hare, ‘good’ is generally used in one of two ways: intrinsic and instrumental. “There has been a disposition among philosophers to do one of two opposite things. The first is to suppose that all value-judgements whatever relate to the performance of an object of a function distinct from the object itself. The second is to suppose that, because there are some objects which are commended for their own sakes, and do not have an obvious function beyond their mere existence, to commend such an object is to do something quite different from commending an object which does have a function” (Hare 1952). I have already discussed intrinsic uses of ‘good’. However, when that version of good is insufficient, we turn to the second. We justify why something is good based upon virtues we deem desirable. This brings us to propaganda. Using good, or its converse, is an efficient means of relaying one’s views and attempting to influence the views of others. The use of the word or concept ‘good’ implies an intrinsic quality that leaves little to no Haskin 10 room for discussion if one assumes it is based in moral fact. However, when one turns to the instrumental use, one can engage a propagandist method of seducing the views of another to align with one’s own preferences. B. Propagation of Preference and Persuasion Intrinsic uses of ‘good’ carry with them a conviction. It is this conviction that may lead others to confuse value with fact. When dealing in fact, one can make an assertion and have it be true or false. It is relatively easily dealt with. With valuations, this is not so easily done as valuations are not necessarily right or wrong. “A moral judgement expresses an attitude toward an act and contextually implies among other things that one believes that that attitude is justified. A moral judgement is justified by determining whether or not the proposition toward which one has an attitude of belief is probably true or false” (Blackstone 1958). However, when an ethical judgement is spoken with a force that implies that the speaker considers it fact, it can be very persuasive. This can be especially true as “[a]ny ethical judgement, of course, is itself a persuasive instrument…” (Stevenson, Ethics and Language 1944). When that is insufficient, or when the speaker is not convincing enough, the speaker will generally resort to reasons as a tool of persuasion. One justify any action one might take to themselves without much effort or significant evidence. When one’s goal is to persuade others to align themselves to or adopt the same belief, reasons become a necessary tool. “When one utters a moral judgment, one contextually implies that one believes that one has reasons for his judgment, reasons which justify that judgment” (Blackstone 1958). Even so, the reasons only seem to justify the action, when they simply cause a feeling of justification. Haskin 11 “Reasons may be psychologically efficacious, that is, effectively evoke a moral approval or disapproval, and yet not justify that approval or disapproval” (Blackstone 1958). The expressed belief, the ethical judgement, expresses the speaker’s approval or disapproval. The reasons the speaker supplies attempt to provoke the corresponding emotions from the listener. It is not only the reasoning that may be manipulated in an effort to persuade. The words used, or the way they are defined may also be altered. “Persuasive definitions redirect interests by changing only the conceptual meaning of an emotively laden term, allowing the emotive meaning to remain roughly constant. Clearly, the opposite change is equally important and prevalent: the emotive meaning may be altered, the conceptual meaning remaining constant” (Stevenson, Facts and Values: Studies in Ethical Analysis 1963). In explicating a moral judgement one has made, one carefully select how one wishes to define their ideas as each word has its own implications. For example, I discussed the different associations between ‘moralists’ and ‘propagandists.’ When one is viewed as a moralist, they are afforded a certain amount of respect and have a positivity associated with them. They are treated more charitably. Propagandists, to the contrary, are condemned and treated with little to no deference. Thus we understand why moralists are opposed to being branded as propagandists and why we brand those contrary to us as being propagandists. IV. Basis for Discussion It is my view that by lacking a factual foundation, moral judgements are left open to greater discussion. It is held within my view that discussion is an attempt by each side to present Haskin 12 their judgements and attempt to persuade those to whom they interact. Values, or moral judgements, are open ended. Consider: If I say X is good, I am communicating that I approve of X. Contextually, within my experiences and background, such a belief is justified. Then the person to whom I am speaking may agree or disagree based upon their own contexts. By interacting with one another, we bring our differing contexts to the discussion and thereby influence each other’s view of the topic. This is vastly different from discussing facts, mainly because they cannot truly be discussed. Rather, facts may be explicated by the more familiar to the less familiar. Facts are facts that are true regardless of context. Moral judgements rely heavily on context. Context is why moral attitudes and beliefs change over time. The constant shifts in cultural, social, and personal contexts is why the popularized and accepted moral judgement are constantly changing. A. Value Versus Fact Facts are assertions that are true. If the assertion is false, then of course it is not fact. Moral judgements, as expressions of preference and approval, do not fit this constraint. “If the words are `This is good,' the valuation is approving, if they say the contrary `This is bad,' it is disapproving. As such the words do not say anything which is true or false” (von Wright 2000). Moral judgements are not moral fact, nor are they indicative of it. What they are indicative of is our capacity to respond to our experiences and interactions. We justify our judgements based on reasons that we have derived from where we have come from in life. They reflect who we are as individuals and what beliefs comprise us. “In uttering a moral judgment one does express one's psychological state and one's desire that those to whom one is speaking adopt the same Haskin 13 attitudes of approval or disapproval that one is expressing. However, one also contextually implies that one believes that one has reasons which support one's judgment, and if one is challenged to give reasons and cannot give any, his utterance, if it is not to be regarded as sheer nonsense, is to be regarded as peculiar, and certainly as not justified” (Blackstone 1958). When we attempt to present a judgement as moral fact, we are unable to justify it beyond its being “good in itself.” Wherever the discussion manages to go, we circle back around to this idea. The proponents of moral fact are resistant to the possibility that there is no “good in itself,” other than what we have dictated it to be. Yet, that dictation is constantly shifting as our tastes and values change. B. Contextual Shifting of Values Over Time In my discussion of Hare’s work, I addressed the cycle through which moral frameworks are adapted and passed on through generations. My view is that we cause the moral frameworks adapt and respond to the constant shifting of circumstances. “Just as the scientist does not try to rewrite all that is in the textbooks, but takes that for granted and sticks to his own particular researches, so [an individual] will take over bodily the principles of his elders and adapt them in detail, by his own decisions, to suit his own circumstances from time to time” (Hare 1952). We affect the moral values, and subsequently the moral judgements, because we are responsive to the changes cause by our experiences. As we interact, we are faced with new (to us) modes of being and different circumstances that might have otherwise remained foreign. By adapting, we allow our societies to adapt as well. “This is how in a well-ordered society morality remains stable, Haskin 14 and at the same time gets adapted to changing circumstances” (Hare 1952). For example, we are still adapting our views of the LGBTQ community. Some societies have begun shifting to a more tolerant and accepting viewpoint.3 Same-sex marriage was only legalized in the United States in 2015, but it has been a gradual shift in beliefs and attitudes. V. Alasdair MacIntyre and Emotivism A. Objection 1 MacIntyre makes a claim that emotivism “fail[ed] to reckon with… the difference that it would make to morality if emotivism were not only true, but also widely believed to be true” (MacIntyre 2007). Emotivism did not fail to reckon with that possibility, it treats it as though it were already in place. Under my interpretation, the point is not to necessarily convince other people that their moral judgements are simply an expression of preference, but rather to notice the way that people utilize language to make moral judgements and understand the correlation between their professed moral views and their personal preferences. Emotivism proposes an analysis of sentence structure, word choice, and meaning. In a manner of speaking, each person, even without knowing, is operating under this system. We choose moral frameworks to suit our preferences and when they do not align, we propose a ‘new and improved’ version of that framework. One could look at Utilitarianism as an example. Bentham’s hedonistic utilitarianism was deemed 3 Marzullo, Michelle A., and Gilbert Herdt. "Marriage Rights and LGBTQ Youth: The Present and Future Impact of Sexuality Policy Changes." Ethos (00912131) 39, no. 4 (December 2011): 526-552. SocINDEX with Full Text, EBSCOhost (accessed November 23, 2016) Haskin 15 insufficient by John Stuart Mill, so to reconcile what he believed with what he liked about the main ideas of Utilitarianism, Stuart proposed a new version with higher and lower pleasures.4 B. Objection 2 The second objection I will address is that concerning social interactions. MacIntyre claims: “The sole reality of distinctively moral discourse is the attempt of one will to align the attitudes, feelings, preferences, and choices of another with its own. Others are always means, never ends” (MacIntyre 2007). Here he fails to address both sides of the interaction. While moral language does operate in a propagandist method, the people using it are responsive to the moral values of others. By engaging a discussion with another person, we not only attempt to change the attitudes and beliefs of the other, we submit ourselves to their attempt to change us as well. In order for the interaction to be a discussion, all parties must contribute, otherwise it may just be called sermonizing or lecturing. While it is not comparable to Kant’s idea of treating everyone as ‘ends in themselves,’ it does allow for people to be treated as both ends and means. It does not entrench anyone into one particular category, nor does it obligate one to try. Instead, it allows for a measuring of wills and beliefs. It opens up new possibilities for discussion and sharing. Also, the intensity of the propagandist/moralist dialogue is determined by the conviction and determination of those involved. 4 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, ed. George Sher, Second ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub., 2001). Haskin 16 C. Objection 3 MacIntyre charges emotivism with being impersonal. He says, “Its use presupposes the existence of impersonal criteria – the existence, independently of the preferences or attitudes of speaker and hearer, of standards of justice or generosity or duty” (MacIntyre 2007). This is not so. Emotivism has an inherent implication that we are very much personally influenced. What we believe and the orientation of our attitudes are contingent upon our culture, social sphere, and personal experiences. It indicates that we are propagating them in our interactions with others while submitting ourselves to the propagations of others, who are being separately influenced by their experience of those same factors. Our personal beliefs and attitudes lead us to the moral frameworks that stipulate the standards of ‘justice or generosity or duty.’ VI. Conclusion Morality is a subjective and fluid concept. As we change and adapt our values and tastes, our moral frameworks are following behind. By understanding the language we use and by examining how we communicate our views to others, we are able to understand our own beliefs and attitudes better. Emotivism is not without flaws, but it is, under this paper’s view, the most adept at understanding what it is we are communicating to others with moral language. By addressing our utilization of propagandist tactics and requiring us to face the influence our beliefs and attitudes have over our ability to communicate, we are able to find and adapt to new beliefs and attitudes that we otherwise might have be cut off from. It also allows us the possibility to influence others with our views. Moral judgements are moral valuations. We express our beliefs by propagating them to others and by being influenced by the propagations of Haskin 17 others. The fluidity of morality is what allows for growth and adaptation. The lack of moral fact is what allows for the fluidity. As such, emotivism provides the best understanding of our moral valuations and the ways in which we communicate them. Haskin 18 Bibliography Blackstone, William Thomas. "Objective Emotivism." The Journal of Philosophy 55, no. 24 (1958): 1054-062. doi:10.2307/2021941. Buscemi, Francesco. "Edible lies: How Nazi propaganda represented meat to demonize the Jews." Media, War & Conflict 9, no. 2 (August 2016): 180-197. Communication & Mass Media Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed November 20, 2016). Hare, R. M. The Language of Morals. New York: Oxford University Press, 1952. Heimer, Ernst. Der Giftpilz. Germany: Julius Streicher, 1938. MacIntyre, Alasdair C. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. Third ed. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007. Marzullo, Michelle A., and Gilbert Herdt. "Marriage Rights and LGBTQ Youth: The Present and Future Impact of Sexuality Policy Changes." Ethos (00912131) 39, no. 4 (December 2011): 526-552. SocINDEX with Full Text, EBSCOhost (accessed November 23, 2016) Mill, John Stuart. Utilitarianism, ed. George Sher, Second ed., Indianapolis: Hackett Pub., 2001. Stevenson, Charles L. Ethics and Language. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944. Stevenson, Charles L. Facts and Values: Studies in Ethical Analysis. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963. von Wright, Georg Henrik. "Valuations – or How to Say the Unsayable." Ratio Juris 13, no. 4 (December 2000): 347. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed November 1, 2016).