Propaganda and Moralism in Art: An Ordinary Language Perspective

PROPAGANDA AND MORALISM IN ART 1 Propaganda and Moralism in Art: An Ordinary Language Perspective Galen McTaggart Stetson University PROPAGANDA AND MORALISM IN ART 2 Propaganda and Moralism in Art: An Ordinary Language Perspective George Orwell, in All Art is Propaganda (2009) makes a conflation between ‘moralism’ and ‘propaganda’ in his literary critiques, which I believe stems from an unintentionally vague and overreaching understanding of propaganda. This overly-vague use of ‘propaganda’ is deliberately explicated in Charles Stevenson’s Ethics and Language (1976) , where he makes the argument that there is no distinguishable difference between ‘moralism’ and propaganda’ at all. I fear that this perspective on language, particularly when considering art, can breed deep-rooted skepticism, making us wary of the artist’s intent and fearful of the possible effects that artistic “propaganda” can have on us. We can consider the unfortunate results of this extreme skepticism, notably in the obscenity trial following the publishing of Allen Ginsberg’s poem HOWL (1957). To combat this sort of linguistic confusion, I employ ordinary language philosophy to consider the uses, effects, and context of language when evaluating meaning, pushing my claim that there are important distinctions to be made between ‘propaganda’ and ‘moralism.’ I also consider the etymology of ‘propaganda’ to help draw a clear picture of its ordinary understanding. There is another issue at hand, however, besides the conflation of ‘moralism’ and propaganda,’ which is Orwell’s claim that all art is propaganda, meaning that all art is somehow morally concerned; I maintain that there is the possibility of morally neutral art. I will argue against the conflation made of ‘moralism’ and ‘propaganda,’ as well as for the possibility of morally neutral art, as both these issues put heavy consideration on the context, use, and effects of language and art. Beginning where these issue arise, Orwell’s posthumously published collected essays All Art is Propaganda (2009) makes the claim that in fact, all art expresses trenchant aesthetic, PROPAGANDA AND MORALISM IN ART 3 philosophical, and ethical commentary. Through analysis and reviews of multiple works, Orwell touts the view that indeed art is necessarily propagandist. Interestingly, and what I hope to explore in depth, is Orwell’s conflation of ‘moralism’ and ‘propaganda’. I question that in his view there is no major difference between the claim that an artwork necessarily has moral content and the claim that this makes it the same as propaganda. We can better understand Orwell’s confusion in light of Charles Stevenson’s writings on morality and propaganda as found in Ethics and Language (1976), where the two major issues with Orwell’s thesis are explicated. The first issue arises from the conflation of the words ‘moralism’ and ‘propaganda.’ This first issue will be the main focus of my thesis. The second issue in Orwell’s thesis comes from the vagueness and broad application of his use of ‘propaganda,’ which Stevenson ascribes to overly vague working definitions. These two primary issues, while deeply connected, are separate philosophical problems. Orwell’s second issue, the issue of vagueness, makes me fear that approaching propaganda with such a broad scope would claim that all art is propaganda, Orwell also makes an implicit claim that all art necessarily has a prescriptive component. This is an entirely different philosophical claim, however, and even operating under the assumption that all art carries a moral message, Orwell fails to make important meaningful distinctions within that context. To explicate Orwell’s failure to make these distinctions, I’ll consider the effects of such an argument within the context of Allen Ginsberg’s infamous poem HOWL and the ensuing obscenity trial. We can begin to unpack Orwell’s conflation of moralism and propaganda by looking at the same conflation repeated in Stevenson’s Ethics and Language (1976), which approaches propaganda not from an ethical critique of art, like Orwell does, but from an analytic critique of PROPAGANDA AND MORALISM IN ART 4 moral language. Stevenson’s aptly titled chapter “Moralists and Propagandists” will serve as a counter-thesis on which my own arguments are based. Stevenson argues that both moralism and propaganda are persuasively defining terms with strongly emotive influences (1976, p.243). In ordinary language, we understand a moralist to be someone who endeavors to influence attitudes, often using argument support, and occasionally using other methods of persuasion. Propagandists as well seek to exert influence. Though they have a similar core, ‘propagandist’ carries a heavy stigma of condemnation, while ‘moralist’ carries an air of comparative respect, suggesting tolerance or even praise. While people are accustomed to reserving the term propaganda for what they condemn or fear for being manipulation or deceit, moralists by contrast are said to be people who try to tell the whole truth (1976, p.247). Stevenson succinctly states that “there can be no perfect fidelity to common usage when common usage is vague and ambiguous (1976, p.247).” For Stevenson, the vagueness of these terms, and more than this their extremely broad scope of use, allow us to have precision only in general aspects, preventing us from discovering a distinction that is clearly implicit in our language (1976, p.244). This is to say, the vagueness of general use and lack of sharp distinctions leads Stevenson to the conclusion that there is no such distinction at all to be found implicit in our language. (I later return to this point and will argue fervently against this move with heavy reference to ordinary language philosophy, but I digress.) He goes on, quoting Lumley that “There is no the way in which propaganda ‘is in practice recognized,’ but in a baffling confusion of ‘ways.’” (1933, chap ii). Instead of analyzing our ordinary use of language, Stevenson attempts to separate the words ‘moralist’ and ‘propagandist’ from their living context, PROPAGANDA AND MORALISM IN ART 5 considering abstract definitions that are not persuasive or emotive in the way that ordinary language is. Continuing his thesis, Stevenson writes that such emotive terms must be neutralized for analytic use. This can be done, he argues, by allowing the tone of context to stand as compensation for the emotive tone of either ‘moralist’ or ‘propagandist’. That is, by balancing a laudatory term with a derogatory term, the emotive tone can effectively be balanced out and neutralized (1976, p.246). For example, by applauding an artwork for being propagandistic, or perhaps by condemning the same piece as moralist, the derogatory or laudatory weight of the words ‘propagandist’ and ‘moralist’ become balanced by the opposing context in which they are used. Such a neutralized definition would include both ‘moralist’ and ‘propagandist’, which in their non-emotive meanings become interchangeable according to Stevenson. The corresponding praise or blame assigned would be irrelevant to the term used in discussion, either ‘propagandist’ or ‘moralist’ delivering the same message. Stevenson argues that we should in fact make efforts to purport these neutralized meanings, leaving such terms free for a detached description; ordinary use, he argues, has decreased the natural range of the terms’ descriptive meanings (1976, p.248). Here I must reject Stevenson’s linguistic perspective of considering meaning to come before use; referencing Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (1968), we can better understand language as evolving by an intrinsic connection between meaning and use, each supporting each other. In this understanding the meaning, or definition, of a word is truly inseparable from its use. I will discuss this in greater detail later on. PROPAGANDA AND MORALISM IN ART 6 Returning to Stevenson’s argument, he believes that we further reiterate of emotive use of ‘propaganda’ and ‘moralism’ by way of conflating these persuasive terms. He points out that we do this readily; something that is propaganda to one person may easily be seen as moralism to another, and indeed points can be made for both perspectives (1976, p.248.) The ‘propaganda’ and ‘moralism’ in this example would not be held to strict definitions, but instead would derive their meaning through use, context, and emotion. This, Stevenson argues, purports his view that because these terms seem to lack clear definitions and derive their stipulative meaning from emotive use, they in fact have no differentiating aspects. Interestingly, I believe this example provides more criticism than support for Stevenson’s thesis. If such terms have no necessary definition but instead derive meaning through context and use, this only reiterates Wittgenstein’s claim that use is integral to understanding meaning. This line of argument of course only extends when such terms are used consistently in similar ways in our ordinary language - which even Stevenson admits (1976, p.243). Though there are cases in which these terms may be used in apparent conflict with each other, such as in the previous consideration, the conflict arises from the particular object of contention, not from the speaker’s use of the term. The emotion, force, and intention behind these statements remain relatively uniform despite varying perspectives on the object being described as ‘propaganda’ or ‘moralism.’ More than Stevenson’s concern of term conflation, he is also troubled by the apparently over-vague use of ‘propaganda’ and ‘moralism.’ ‘Propaganda’ in particular, because of its negative connotation, has a vague and expansive use that Stevenson worries breeds suspicion of persuasive language. He argues that such vague use can “forward an emotional plea for emotional apathy (1976, p.249),” which is to say that proliferation of the loosely defined term PROPAGANDA AND MORALISM IN ART 7 ‘propaganda’ can incite a fear of everything under this vague and overreaching use. Indeed, having too broad of a use of ‘propaganda’ causes hesitation to even seriously consider content that may contain persuasive language that under this umbrella would be considered propaganda, but under normal usage would be considered mere moralism. This is to suggest that because emotive terms are sometimes abused they must be done away with altogether. Stevenson I believe rightly disagrees that all emotive language must be thrown out, but he does consider ‘propaganda’ and ‘moralism’ to be a case of emotive terms that we are better left without (1976, p.249-251). These concerns of Stevenson are amplified by the ubiquitousness of persuasive language, which seemingly surrounds us in our literature and art (1976, p.250). With ‘propaganda’ and moralism’ in their emotive form being used loosely and vaguely, in combination with the proliferation of persuasive language, Stevenson fears that we will associate mere recognition of persuasion with propagandistic language and ergo with condemnation. The practical problem, he argues, is then not a matter of avoiding all persuasion, but instead decided which persuasions to avoid and which to accept (1976, p.251). Though I argue via Wittgenstein that solving this “problem” is just a matter of recognizing and accepting ordinary uses of ‘propaganda’ and ‘moralism,’ eliminating the need for sharp definitions merely by understanding their context, Stevenson believes that because of their common conflation and vagueness we must do away with distinctions between the terms altogether. He argues that if their emotive meanings are not neutralized, then it must be the aim to avoid making distinctions between ‘propaganda’ and ‘moralism,’ as argued previously. If, however, the emotive meaning is neutralized, then there would be no further occasion to define between ‘propaganda’ and ‘moralism’ (1976, p.251). In PROPAGANDA AND MORALISM IN ART 8 either case, the end is the same: the emotivism of ‘propaganda’ and ‘moralism’ is rejected in favor of a mutually neutral definition of persuasion. The result of this line of reasoning is then using ‘moralism’ for all instances of persuasion, in its most neutral and broad sense, designating those who purposefully influence attitudes in some specified direction beyond the requirements of pure cognition - that is to say, beyond basic reasoning (1976, p.251). (It is important to note that Stevenson’s choice of ‘moralism’ in favor of ‘propaganda’ is arbitrary, because if we are agreeing to use the neutral sense of these terms they became truly interchangeable.) In the case of specifying qualitative values, such as positive persuasion or less than savory persuasion, Stevenson encourages talking about “good” moralist and “bad” moralist. Anyone using ethical judgments would in this sense would speak in the capacity of a moralist, or a propagandist if that is the term so arbitrarily chosen - when these terms are completely neutralized one may say that all moralists are propagandists and all propagandists are moralists (1976, p. 252). This conclusion strikes me as remarkably unintuitive, and inconsistent with Stevenson’s thesis. Stevenson first argued that the difference between ‘moralist’ and ‘propagandist’ was purely emotive, and ergo the terms should be neutralized and interchangeable. If this is the case however, how should it follow that we can then qualify the term with an emotive phrase such as ‘good’ or ‘bad,’ without again simply using emotive terms? If we still condemn certain persuasions and praise others, how is changing the mere words associated with these uses working towards neutralization? If we share Stevenson’s concerns of wanting a neutralized term for certain cases, we already have the term ‘persuasion’ and we use it often and ordinarily, as even Stevenson does throughout this chapter. The words uttered may be changed in Stevenson’s PROPAGANDA AND MORALISM IN ART 9 proposal but the contextual use and emotive meaning remains the same; by eliminating the ordinary language we use, all that is being done is creating unintuitive new terminology that is synonymous in use to the previous terms. We can see the problematic results of applying Stevenson’s proposal of conflating ‘moralist’ and ‘propagandist’ when considering art that is arguably, and commonly seen, as non-propagandist yet still containing obvious moral claims; I’ll use Allen Ginsberg’s momentous poem HOWL as a primary example of the dangers of Orwell and Stevenson’s view. When the poem was originally published in 1956, though recognized only on a modest scale, it was regarded highly and received critical acclaim from Ginsberg’s peers. The shocking content of the poem, both highly moral and political in nature, attracted social pariahs within Ginsberg’s social sphere but also attracted attention from U.S. customs agents. Agents deemed the work indecent and obscene on the grounds of its explicit sexual content, specifically in regards to homosexual references. HOWL was ergo seized by U.S. Customs and the San Francisco police, and became the subject of a long and tumultuous court case (Ferlinghetti, 2015.) HOWL, as William Carlos Williams describes it, was written as a very literal howl; a long and doleful cry, a howl of pain and of defeat (Ginsberg, 1956). Dedicated to Ginsberg’s friend Carl Solomon, a writer who voluntarily institutionalized himself and became the subject of shock therapy, HOWL was written as a howl of defeat for the intellectuals, artists, and hipsters of Ginsberg’s cultural peers. It condemned capitalism and classism, exalting Ginsberg’s counterculture of the beat generation (Ginsberg, 1956). Despite its moralistic revolt against government and popular culture, Ginsberg’s HOWL was at the time of writing, not intended to be publicly released, but only shared amongst close friends and peers (Ginsberg, 1956). That is, the PROPAGANDA AND MORALISM IN ART 10 moral claims made in the poem were not intended to be public, much less intended to indoctrinate others to Ginsberg’s counterculture lifestyle. Rather, Ginsberg intended his moral claims to be an expression and invitation for discussion and debate of the social injustices he and his peers faced. His HOWL can be read as a call for help in this way, pleading for his audience to listen to him and engage in a conversation. We can consider this implication of this intent in the light of Laden’s writings on invitations, in which taking part in responsive and reciprocal open exchange - or possibility of exchange - of reasons, ideas, and rebuttals qualifies an invitation to reasoning (2012, p.36). I argue that this invitation to reasoning is one of the defining characteristics of moralism in contrast with propaganda, which I will defend further later in my arguments. According to the judicial verdict (Ferlinghetti, 1976), during the obscenity trial critics of the poem claimed that Ginsberg’s use of explicit language proliferated obscene thoughts and images, regarding it as homosexual propaganda. They argued that this inclusion of persuasive language and moralistic claims in the poem were an attempt to indoctrinate readers into Ginsberg’s moral position. In defense of HOWL , poets and professors argued that the work’s obscene content was merely a contributing element of the piece, not to be taken as the entirety of the artistic message. Further, defendants argued, Ginsberg did not have the intent of cultivating explicitly sexual thoughts, and indeed when read in context, the sexual references were radically unsensual. It was then in violation of free speech to censor Ginsberg’s work when there was no real threat of propaganda, that is to say of subverting reasonable thought. In light of this, some historians claim that the trial was more about a conservative desire to still rising counterculture movements than about censoring merely sexual content, fearing the power of a moralist message PROPAGANDA AND MORALISM IN ART 11 in an emotive art piece (Ferlinghetti, 1976). In the court’s ruling, the judge sided with the defendant and maintained that free speech may not be curbed when the community has the chance to answer back (Ferlinghetti, 1976). This judicial decision rests on the idea that the moral content of Ginsberg’s work invites discussion and debate, opposed to closing off reasoning as the prosecutors argued, a thought that’s consistent with previous arguments in favor of the distinctions of use for ‘propaganda’ and ‘moralism.’ When reading HOWL , it’s clear that this is a persuasive work with strong moral content, but I argue that it is a far cry from propaganda, for the same reasons that its defenders argued its merit in the 1957 obscenity trial. I argue that this case presents an example in which the equation of moral content to propaganda, like Orwell and Stevenson’s, fails. There is a sinister danger in equating moralism and propaganda, one in which we fall into a deep skepticism of motives and the possibility of genuine moral conversation. When we read all moral messages as propaganda, like the prosecutors of HOWL , we begin to guard ourselves from open conversation and consideration of new ideas; I argue that this sort of deep skepticism becomes fear mongering, inciting isolationism and a refusal to participate openly not only in artistic experiences, but in the human experience itself. (Anthony Laden explores this consideration moral response in his discussion of invitations to reason, which I will reference later on.) To avoid this downward spiral of skepticism and doubt, I argue that we should reject Orwell and Stevenson’s perspectives and instead make a strong distinction between moralism and propaganda. By referencing works by Wittgenstein and Austin, I argue that we can use an Ordinary Language approach to look at the differences in how we ordinarily use the words PROPAGANDA AND MORALISM IN ART 12 “moral” and “propaganda,” particularly on the work being done by these words and their perlocutionary effects. For instance, when we use ‘moralist’, we talk about someone who endeavors to judge and influence moral attitudes, but more than this we often use ‘moralist’ to talk positively about this person, and to praise his or her endeavors as morally upright or righteous. Contrasting this positive sense of moralist, there is also the pejorative sense in which ‘moralist’ is used not to praise one’s moral standing, but to condemn a sort of moral hypocrisy. In this way a moralist can be judgemental, opposed judging, placing standards on others to which she herself is unwilling to uphold. In this pejorative understanding a moralist makes moral judgements, promulgating a positive moral message while failing to live up to such a standard. These uses, far from irrelevant from its meaning as Stevenson argues (1976), are integral to understanding the term. Likewise, we can look at propaganda. “Propagandist” is used to describe negatively someone who endeavors to influence moral attitudes, and moreso to condemn the techniques that the influencer employs. “Propaganda” is used to describe works that are intentionally misleading, manipulative, or otherwise make use of exploitation. On the other side of this, there is a positive sense of propaganda: derived from a new 1622 administrative body of the Catholic Church tasked with propagating the faith, propaganda was originally a neutral and non-emotive term. In its early days, propaganda meant simply to propagate. A common objection here is questioning the origin of the authority of “ordinary use.” In other words, who decides what “ordinary use” is? This question is an important concern to raise, but its point of contention rests on a misunderstanding of “ordinary use.” This use is not in reference to what everyone says, or even what the majority says, but about what words should be PROPAGANDA AND MORALISM IN ART 13 chosen and for what reasons. Of course not everyone will agree on what word is most appropriate in a given situation, but we do not need a universal consensus to move ahead. We only need enough shared concepts to have a conversation in that situation. The context of this conversation is important as well, as our understandings and uses of words vary over time and over places. These words and their uses have a grammar, and by looking at their uses we can see the whole concept (Wittgenstein, 1953); moralism is often used to describe judgements, or to promote morality, while propaganda is often used to manipulate, or to influence. There is a pejorative and positive use of both these words. The good sense of propaganda, as mere promulgation, is used in the same way as the bad sense of moralism, as judgemental promotions. If we take the bad sense of propaganda and the positive sense of moralism however, as are most often used in ordinary language, there is a radically difference between the two. We can see that these words have multiple uses, and following Wittgenstein, we can piece these uses together to form language neighborhoods of sorts. Moralist and propagandist neighborhoods are close, and they seem to have a lot in common, but we have to be careful not to stumble a few too many blocks in without realizing where we are. There is another objection to be made here, one against the distinctions drawn out between “propaganda” and “moralism:” If everyone has an agenda, how can we trust that this person is not trying to trick us? What difference is there then between a moralist and a propagandist, when they are both trying to push their views onto their audience? I argue however that even if we are working off the assumption that everyone has an agenda within a moral conversation - which is a hefty assumption to make in the first place, though I will not get into PROPAGANDA AND MORALISM IN ART 14 that here - the methods employed and the context in which the moral discussion takes place are important when establishing the possibility of a genuine moral conversation. The methods that someone engages to push their agenda, whether in rational debate or in trickery, is what should determine our levels of trust towards them, and our possible responses. We can consider a word’s perlocutionary effects as well when looking at how we use words; Austin writes in How to Do Things with Words that "Saying something will often, or even normally, produce certain consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts, or actions of the audience, or of the speaker, or of other persons: and it may be done with the design, intention, or purpose of producing them (1962, p.101).” What this means is that more than the linguistic function of words, such as the use of words that Wittgenstein considers, there are elements of words that are external to the function. Perlocutionary effects are the effect that is achieved in the hearer. Propaganda, in this light, does more than tell us something, but has a particular kind of effect on the listener that the `speaker cannot control, but hopes to control nevertheless. Jason Stanley’s aptly titled How Propaganda Works (2015) looks closely at the perlocutionary effects of propaganda. Stanley’s work examines deeper than what propaganda does, looking at how propaganda really works, or in what sense propaganda differs from mere commands. Propaganda, Stanley writes, can be understood in two distinct ways: classically, as “bypassing the rational will…. Propaganda is manipulation of the rational will to close off debate (2015, p.48)” and in a more nuanced version as articulated by Noam Chomsky, simply as biased speech that irrationally closes off certain options. Both of these versions have the same perlocutionary effects: betraying the rational will to close off debate. PROPAGANDA AND MORALISM IN ART 15 We can understand the rational will by briefly referring to Immanuel Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (1993). Kant writes that a rational will must be regarded as autonomous, where the will of the rational being (capable of moral deliberation) stems from themselves rather than an outside force (1993, 389). That is, the rational will must be free, not necessarily free from outside influence, as this poses a nearly impossible ideal, but free from outside manipulation. The importance of this freedom of the rational will is explicated in Kant’s Principle of Autonomy, “the principle of every human will as a will universally legislating through all its maxims (1993, 432).” This is to say that the autonomous rational being has the capacity to deliberate and act on one’s own moral decisions, opposed to following a moral code enacted by others. With this background of the role of the rational will in moral deliberations, we can consider how propaganda works in order to close off genuine moral conversation, referring to Anthony Laden’s Reasoning: A social picture (2012). Laden’s arguments come from a perspective of shared reasoning, or the sort of relationship required for a mutual moral conversation that upholds all participant’s rational will. Reasoning, or the rational being’s capacity to deliberate morality, then involves being open and responsive to criticisms. An invitation to reasoning is an invitation for the audience to accept or reject the speaker’s reasons, while the participants remain open to the possibility of a reasoned conversation. This sort of open receptiveness means that the speaker has a right to be heard in this context, as well as call for a response from the audience; this right to call for a response does not entail a right to receive a response, only to invite the possibility. This call for a response creates an invitation, and more than this, and invitation made in terms of equality. The speaker must appeal to the audience PROPAGANDA AND MORALISM IN ART 16 without invoking any sense of authority (2012, p.32). The equality of this moral conversation is critical to the unique social reasoning created, which we can see as linked to moralists and the moral conversation they invite. In considering the equality this invitation requires, we can see that reasoning has a fundamentally different authority involved than legislating. Legislating in this context then refers to making moral claims for others, which I argue is analogous to propagandists. Unlike authoritative legislating, invitations to reasoning allow for the creation of new relationships that take place within a shared spaces of reason (2012, p.33). Laden describes this creation of new space: “When I invite you to take my words as speaking for you, I open up a space of reasons for us to share, and if you accept my invitation, you thus participate in our joint construction of this space of reasons as one we share (2012, p.33).” The joint construction of this space indicates a relationship of equal listening and hearing, collaborating through joint efforts, in which rejection is always a possibility in a way that it is not possible in legislating. This is reflective of the moral conversations and joint creation of reasoning involved in moralism, as well as the contrasting authoritative legislating involved in propaganda. We can examine this shared space of reasons more closely, looking at how it is connected to willful action, which is in turn connected to debating and decisions. The first activity in this space of reasons is reasoning, which as discussed previously involves presenting reasoning to the audience that can be accepted or rejected, and opening the possibility of responsive and reciprocal conversations with an exchange of reasons. Invitations to reasoning and entering this shared space prolong reasoning, extending the conversation (2012, p.36). The second activity comes later and involves judgements made with these reasons. With the background established PROPAGANDA AND MORALISM IN ART 17 by reasoning, the participants may issue commands; issuing commands necessary for action is a different activity than reasoning, though it takes place against the background of reasoning (2012, p.37). The authority behind these judgements and commands come from the details of the interactions within the shared space of reasons, and the relationships developed in that context (2012, p.38). In this social picture that Laden presents, reasoning can prepare the ground for decisions, but conclusions are beyond the activity of reasoning. If we are to carry on the picture of moralism being connected to reasoning and invitations, we can see that the activity moralism involves is separate and distinct from any sort of judgement or decision making. Though the judgments reached from the moralist conversation are closing off debate, reasoning itself is a continuous prolonging of shared reasons and conversation. Will this in mind, we can next look at certain contrasting aspects or propaganda, in particular its etymology. As mentioned previously, ‘propaganda’ is derived from a 1622 administrative body of the Catholic Church tasked with propagating the faith. Propaganda in this use meant only to spread the faith, rather than indoctrinate. Even in this positive sense of propaganda, there is a dangerously close connection to indoctrination, and of uncritical religious conversion. It wasn’t until the mid-19th century, specifically the outbreak of WWI, that propaganda became associated with authoritarian and totalitarian states. Propagation then became degenerated into mere indoctrination, and ‘propaganda’ began to form into its modern use. This shift to pejorative use spiked during WWII, due largely in part to the Nazi party’s proliferation of biased and misleading information. (The Story of Propaganda, 2017) This new understanding of propaganda as a negative, mistrusted medium has historically been associated with authoritative states, generally being proliferated by governments and those PROPAGANDA AND MORALISM IN ART 18 in positions of power. Triumph of the Will , a 1935 German film chronicling the Nazi Party Congress in Nuremberg, was commissioned by Adolf Hitler to depict Germany’s rise as a great power and Hitler’s role as its leader. Widely regarded as one of the greatest and most successful uses of propaganda in film, Triumph of the Will works by showing a warped and one-sided perspective of the Nazi Party’s agenda and morals. The film itself purposely avoids anti-semitic language and outright derogatory remarks, focusing instead on the glory and greatness of Germany and its military. Through these coercive methods, Triumph of the Will is used to rally support in a positive, nationalistic energy, without the viewer knowing quite what they are rallying for (Ebert, 1994). In democratic states as well, we can see examples of propaganda betraying the rational will. The US’s military issued an American counterpart to Germany’s Triumph of the Will : Why We Fight, directed by Frank Capra, was a series of seven propaganda films released from 1942-1945. Inspired by and in direct response to Hitler’s film, Why We Fight was issued by the US Military in order to garner support for the war efforts, aimed at presenting the US as the epitome of freedom, and war as the only option for those supporting democratic ideals (German, 1990, p.237-48). These analogous examples propaganda show that the content of propagandistic claims is irrelevant, whether rallying support for democratic ideals and freedom, or building national pride for a totalitarian state. The methods through which these propaganda films are carried out, particularly their explicitly one-sided perspective, aimed at a conclusive result, are the defining characteristics of the modern pejorative understanding of propaganda. Propaganda’s modern etymological shift to use as a derogatory term is explored in detail in Stanley’s How Propaganda Works (2015), which explicates the power structures necessary for PROPAGANDA AND MORALISM IN ART 19 propagandists and notes the classist undertones apparent in propaganda. Stanley argues that propaganda works as a mechanism of control, in part by promoting an insider/outsider dichotomy that focuses on the authority of the propagandist and the otherness of those in opposition (2015, p.125-177). Because propaganda works through closing off debate, as I’ve argued previously, there is a necessary element of implicit authority needed, through which propaganda is used to extort power through exclusion of the perspective of certain groups. This is done by deeming a certain group of people as undesirable, or against the values of the society. We can see clearly how this was done in both Triumph of the Will , which highlighted Germans and cast unfavorable light on those in opposition, as well as in Why We Fight , which presented Axis powers as an enemy to the American people. The authority in both these cases comes from the majority party and the resulting influence they have over cultural preferences and perspectives. Though these examples are rooted in political authority this is not necessary; any sense of hierarchical authority in the relevant context is sufficient in promoting the insider/outsider dichotomy. Exploring Pitkin’s The Attack of the Blob (1998), we can again find remarks on the implicit classism and power structures of propaganda. The insider/outsider dichotomy used by propagandist is restated by Pitkin as that of the ‘pariah’ and the ‘parvenue.’ In her writings, Pitkin focuses on Jewish culture: Jews (which can be considered a standing category for any oppressed minority) are social ‘pariahs’ - they may try to reenter society and gain social power, to become a ‘parvenue,’ or they may embrace their place as a social outsider (1998). As pariahs, Jews lack any sense of authority and are placed on the bottom of the social hierarchy. As a parvenue, Jews can begin to climb the social ladder and in turn gain the authority associated with PROPAGANDA AND MORALISM IN ART 20 a higher social standing. This dynamic can be readily seen in the case of Ginsberg’s HOWL , where I argue that Ginsberg as an out-of-favor minority (both a Jew and homosexual) that embraces his otherness, is in that sense a social pariah. He lacks social power, and his identity is centralized on his place as an outsider. Ginsberg’s role as a social pariah excludes him from the power and ability needed to exert propaganda; that is, as an outsider himself he cannot use propaganda as Stanley describes it, as a means of hierarchical control over outsiders. Without the necessary authority, prescriptive claims fall short of propaganda. This is not to say that they must then be moralist claims, but it does exclude them in this way from the obligatory power structures propagandists must be a part of. With these preliminary linguistic distinctions made, I will consider further distinctions helpful in understanding ‘propaganda’ and ‘moralism,’ such as artist’s intent and audience conception. Considering intent, we can refer back works of indubitable propaganda, such as Triumph of the Will and Why We Fight , where there is clearly some element of deception or duplicity. Using techniques such as these that purposefully undermine the audience’s ability to honestly experience and engage the art piece seems integral to the propagandist’s work (Stanley, 2015). As I argued previously, these propagandists use one-sided perspectives to push an agenda; by focusing on black-and-white ethics like this, propagandists intend to only show the only side of the argument that will be most persuasive to their audience. There is not attempt to reason, or to examine multiple view points, but only an attempt to persuade and convert. In this sense, propaganda sways closely to indoctrination, or teaching moral claims absolutely with no critical element. PROPAGANDA AND MORALISM IN ART 21 Up to this point, I have emphasized that propagandist art is characterized by its presentation of a single perspective. It’s worth noting, however, that depending on context this by itself does not necessarily constitute propaganda. As Helen Logino’s Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry (1990) suggests, the social context that knowledge is considered in plays its own role in determining the weight and social value of these perspectives. There are other paths to non-propagandistic art besides a consideration of multiple perspectives, namely in presenting polarizing views within the context of a free thinking environment. This is to say, there can be less pressure on the artist to deliver a neutral perspective and more emphasis on the balance of moral attitudes in the given background. In contexts with such an open exchange of moral ideas, the presentation of polarizing perspectives (even made in an attempt to assert a directive to the audience) can incite insightful considerations and reevaluations of morals, rather than the deceptive and unquestioned agreement that may come in a different context. In such a place of exchange of ideas, the artist’s personal responsibility to maintain a sort of openness is not necessary in achieving moralistic art. In further consideration of what makes propaganda, the response of the audience is central for the propagandist; if the audience is not persuaded, the propaganda has failed. The propagandist of course cannot control what the audience thinks, but they can hope to do so. Conversely, the moralist attempts to persuade his or her audience through moral engagement, inviting understanding and transparency. A moralist cannot fail in the same sense that the propagandist can: the moralist extends an invitation for reasoned response, but the propagandist calls only for results (Laden, 2012). An example of moralist audience conception, and of invitation and engagement, can readily be seen in HOWL, in which Ginsberg fervently asks not PROPAGANDA AND MORALISM IN ART 22 for an audience conversion but for an open and critical consideration of his experiences with social issues. HOWL does not tell us what to think, it only tells us another perspective, inviting us to reconsider our own judgements within the shared space the poem creates. The context in which we use these words, and further, the effects that these words have, are vitally important to understanding their meaning. It becomes clear, I argue, that the notably different uses, contexts, and effects of ‘propaganda’ and ‘moralism’ entail notably differences in meaning as well. When we apply this in the case of HOWL , looking at the work itself and the context in which it was presented, we can read it as a moralist message as opposed to just a propagandist one. Not only is this interpretation more cohesive with our ordinary language concerning HOWL and the trial itself, but it is more cohesive with the artistic experience it entails. In summary of these considerations, we can understand the apparent distinctions between ‘propaganda’ and ‘moralism’ in how we ordinarily use them in our language. The emotive component of these terms is absolutely integral to their use and purpose in our lives; the marked difference in the use of these terms necessitates the difference in words chosen. Propaganda is used to close off debate, such as with Triumph of the Will and Why We Fight , often referred to in condemnation not of the content but of the techniques engaged. In opposition we see moralism as inviting conversation, as seen in HOWL , and refer to ‘moralist’ works with approval, or at least tolerance. The emotional weight we engage ‘propaganda’ and ‘moralism’ with is essentially connected to their use and purpose, and an emotive disengagement from the terms as Stevenson calls for is to consider definitions before considering use. Our language is created by how we use PROPAGANDA AND MORALISM IN ART 23 words, meaning coming from ordinary living; by removing terms from their context we lose the integrity of their meaning and use. Having discussed the first issue of emotive use in Orwell’s thesis, we can next evaluate the second issue of over-vague use. This second issue in Orwell’s thesis comes from his broad application of the use of ‘propaganda,’ which as mentioned earlier is ascribed by Stevenson to an overly vague working definition. By claiming that “all art is propaganda,” Orwell makes the very broad claim that not only is all prescriptive art propaganda, but that all art necessarily has a prescriptive component in the first place. Working with such an overly vague understanding of propaganda leads inevitably, as Stevenson warned, to suspicion and skepticism (1976, p.249). I argue, however, that there is the possibility of non-persuasive art. We can see this evidently in art that not engage us ethically or invite moral judgements and conversations. Arthur Danto’s What Art Is (2014) considers artworks as embodying meanings: all art is about something, and it embodies what it is about. This clearly applies to moralistic and propagandistic artworks, but it also encompasses non-persuasive aesthetic art as well. Art that is merely about aesthetics or the human experience would embody these themes, not necessarily engaging moral judgements in doing so. Indeed, we can neutral art in pieces that explore the human struggle and aesthetics, such as in abstract works like Jackson Pollock’s paintings, Jack Kerouac’s stream-of-consciousness prose, or Richard Linklater’s slice-of-life films. These artworks make no moralistic claims, nor do they involve moral judgements, inasmuch as they embody human experience. Along this thought, aesthetic and morally neutral art is presented as independent from the artist and their intent; the art is separated from its creator once complete, and the artist’s intent is irrelevant when evaluating their work. This is in apparent contrast to PROPAGANDA AND MORALISM IN ART 24 morally conscious art, in which the intent is vital to understanding the work as a whole. Moral art is then always connected to the artist in a way that neutral art is not, and while propaganda and moralism can be used in various ways, the intent of the artist remains integral to understanding and appreciating the work. We can explore this distinction deeper, drawing from Alexander Nehemas’ Only a Promise of Happiness (2011), in understanding aesthetics - that is to say, art merely concerning what is pleasant - as art that does not require moral engagement. This is where morally neutral art falls, made for the sake of aesthetics, or for art itself. This is the view most often touted by artists themselves, preferring to create works that may stand on their own, apart from the artist (Carroll, 2000). This concept of merely pleasant art being beautiful was largely influenced by Immanuel Kant, notably in Critique of the Power of Judgement (2008). Kant developed the idea that aesthetics can be isolated from the beautiful, “from all the sensual, practical, and ethical issues (2011, p.3),” as Nehemas puts it. This is to say that aesthetically beautiful art held independent from its relationships to the rest of the world, including the uses and effects that it may have. Aesthetic art in this way differs significantly from morally prescriptive art, where use and effect are integral to the artwork itself. If we are to take Kant seriously, then we must allow for the category of aesthetically beautiful art, separate from ethically involved art such as propaganda or moralism. In objection to this point, it can be claimed that really all art is political or inherently morally concerned in some way. Even Robert Rauschenberg’s “White Paintings” - consisting of five canvasses of pure, textureless white - has been argued to contain an implicit moral message ("Robert Rauschenberg, White Painting [three Panel], 1951." 2017). However, this reading PROPAGANDA AND MORALISM IN ART 25 comes not from the artist, but rather from the audience. In experiencing art it is not only possible, but in fact expected for the audience to read their own meaning into an artwork. A blank canvas can have a multitude of meanings to each viewer, with each perspective being just as valid of an experience as the other. Despite this, these varied experiences and readings are telling of the audience itself, opposed to the artist or the work in question; the intent of the artist is absolutely integral to understanding the role of the piece. The artist’s voice, in the same way, is inseparable from meaning when there is in fact a meaning to be conveyed. While the audience’s subjective experience of art is important to understanding the full picture, the artist’s own experience and intent is crucial when contemplating inherent moral meaning. With this rebuttal in mind, we can see the importance of this distinction between morally involved art and aesthetic art when considering the context in which we think about such works; the context in which we evaluate artworks is crucial to understanding their value and their use within our culture, in the same way that the context of words are integral to understanding their role in language. If we were to consider a piece such as Triumph of the Will without context, we would perhaps be met with an aesthetically beautiful and thoughtful artwork. The background of the film is not an afterthought to consider, however, but should be in the forefront of our minds when experiencing this piece. Without this context, the meaning and use fail to strike us with their full weight. Looking at HOWL without context, we may be led astray into seeing it as a work of homosexual propaganda. When we consider the author's intent, and the use of this piece, however, we discover a very different perspective. Use, intent, and effects are all necessarily connected to meaning, whether in art or language, and only through a careful contemplation of PROPAGANDA AND MORALISM IN ART 26 their full capacity allows us to grasp their value and role; we need the full picture to make judgements. With this all in consideration, my first claim that there is indeed a very important distinction to be made between ‘moralism’ and ‘propaganda’ is heavily supported. Emotionally loaded terms, these words carry heavy effects and potent uses that are crucial to grasping their different meanings. When we consider the conflation of these terms made by Orwell, we can see that by evaluating the perlocutionary effects, the work done, and the context of ‘moralism’ and ‘propaganda’ the differences between these words become self-evident. Propaganda closes off rational debate, while moralism invites conversation. Using these same methods of looking at ordinary use, we can evaluate my second claim that there is non-prescriptive art. It is clear that Orwell is working with too vague an understanding and an overly broad application of ‘propaganda”: there is always the possibility of morally neutral, purely aesthetic art, as Nehemas and Kant argued. The importance of these claims rests on the assumption that use and context and integral to a full understanding of how, and why, we choose the words that we do. Decontextualizing and adopting a theoretical perspective leads to a disenchantment with ordinary use, as well as infidelity towards our language. As Wittgenstein is often quoted, “don’t think, but look (1968, p.36)!” suggesting that all we need to know about our language is already apparent. My conclusions from this work are then very simple. Firstly, Orwell is incorrect in assuming that all art has moral content. There can be, and in fact are many examples of, art that is simply about aesthetics or the human experience, entirely lacking any prescriptive message on morality. Secondly, even art that does have moral content is not necessarily propaganda, though of course it could be. We can understand propaganda then as closing off rational debate, in PROPAGANDA AND MORALISM IN ART 27 opposition to the invitation to moral conversation that moralism issues. Propagandists try to deceive or otherwise trick their audience into an unquestioned allegiance. Analogous to indoctrination, the purpose of propaganda is the adoption of some unquestioned belief or value system. For example, the idea that Hitler is a great leader and the Jews are a threat to the German state, or that homosexuality and erotic language in literature is wrong. HOWL was considered propaganda by the San Francisco police because it was seen as an attempt to manipulate its readers into becoming homosexuals. Propaganda presents only one side of the issue, and leaves no room for alternative views. We can see moralism then, in its worst sense, as no different than propaganda. However, in its best sense, and in the sense we are most familiar with, moralism opens the door to conversation. Considerations of alternative perspectives are welcomed, and reasons are offered for why the audience should accept or reject a certain moral proposal. Rather than saying that capitalism is wrong flat out, as the propagandist would, the moralist (in the best sense) invites considerations for and against capitalism, presenting a moral rationale in hopes to influence the audience in one way or another. A final important distinction to be made is that the propagandist provides a conclusion for the audience, but the moralist leaves the conversation open. Though both hope to persuade their audience in a certain direction, the propagandist hopes to “close the deal” in some sense, while the moralist can only offer reasons and let the audience decide for themselves. 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