Ideology, Capitalism, and the Autonomous Society

Ideology, Capitalism, and the Autonomous Society Enric Cordoba Dr. Rust 2 Contents Introduction .............................................................................................................. 3 Step 1: Defining Ideology ......................................................................................... 4 Step 2: Is Capitalism and Ideology? ....................................................................... 14 Step 3: The Autonomous Society ........................................................................... 27 Bibliography ........................................................................................................... 36 3 Introduction The following senior research stems from a concern about the way in which our most predominant economic system, capitalism, works. Amartya Sen puts it clearly: “the nature of modern economics has been substantially impoverished by the distance that has grown between economics and ethics” (Sen 7). After realizing the inherited negative consequences in the way we are currently doing economics, I started exploring what capitalism is. Throughout this process, I stumbled upon an ancient, antecedent problem: the recognition that, although we are clearly experiencing negative consequences, we are not trying to create alternatives, which opened a new philosophical concern. A pattern can be seen across history: a system of beliefs is instated in a society, it creates certain problems, but somehow the given system of beliefs resists and rejects alternatives. This phenomenon brought me to ideology, a fascinating concept that has tremendously shaped human history. Finally, it also made me wonder what, if possible, a non-ideological society would look like. The following essay unfolds in three parts: (1) it explores what are the necessary conditions for a system of beliefs to be an ideology; (2) it tests if capitalism satisfies the proposed conditions and therefore if it can or cannot be considered an ideology; and finally, (3) it investigates what a non-ideological society would entail (task for which I use Cornelius Castoriadis’ autonomy theory) and how it would unfold in a macro level: an autonomous society. 4 Step 1: Defining Ideology My interest on ideology grows from realizing how impactful Robert Higgs’ provocative statement is: “Beliefs matter. In the study of human action, nothing is more fundamental than an appreciation of what the actors believe… [and] among the most important of the intermediate1 kinds of belief is ideology” (Riggs 35,36). This statement is heavily packed, but my task here is not to prove how far ideology has shaped human action; I will just assume that ideology has been a primary influence on human action without disparaging other factors or putting ideology on the top of the list. Let me just say that ideology has been decisive, crucial in the unfold of human history—and it is therefore a concept worth paying attention to. The following question of interest then became that, if ideology has such an impact everywhere where there is a human actor: What is an ideology? The system of beliefs in which I have been particularly interested are the ones which founded or lie in the core of neoclassical economic theory; theory from which capitalism emerged. Although capitalism is already commonly classified as an ideology, my initial task will be to dig deeper into this popular classification. First, to be able to frame capitalism as an ideology, the first required step in this paper is to define ideology, that is, to propose what are the necessary conditions to consider a set of beliefs an ideology. Afterwards, the next task will be to test if capitalism satisfies the proposed 1 Riggs defines intermediate with “Between the extremes lie realms of belief where facts, values, and wishful thinking combine in varying proportion. The ‘softer’ forms of knowledge—knowledge being understood here as simply what some people believe, whether others agree or not—guide people’s behavior as much as, perhaps even more than, the ‘harder’ forms do” (Riggs 36). 5 conditions to, then, be able to carry on a well-founded critique to finally offer Castoriadis’ autonomy theory as a potential antidote to a society based on ideology. With the first task in mind, I use Robert Higgs’s On ideology as an Analytical Concept in the Study of Political Economy and Slavoj Žižek’s Mapping ideology. Firstly, I propose the conditions gathered from these two works and, secondly, I test such conditions with other systems of beliefs that are not capitalism. Before delving into such tasks, I want to iterate that there is no group of academicians across the world who would agree with a set of necessary conditions for a system of beliefs to become ideology. So, since no unanimous definition has been set and probably will never be, I humbly propose my own, without claiming any type of validity. I would argue that there is a consensus about ideology is that is composed by a ‘system of beliefs.’ Higgs starts his definition saying that “by ideology I [Higgs] shall mean a somewhat coherent, rather comprehensive belief system about social relations” (Higgs 37); and Zizek defines it as “a complex of ideas (theories, convictions, beliefs, argumentative procedures)” (Zizek 6). Hence, that ideology is composed by a system of beliefs is unanimous among the two main authors from whom I base to construct my definition. This said, I propose an ideology to be a system of beliefs which (1) interprets the world by predetermining what is good or bad which (2) transforms into a particular action or behavior. When such system of beliefs is embraced by the masses, (3) institutional entities are constructed and established at the heart of social reality to self-validate the original system of beliefs. Finally, ideologies (4) create a social relationship of dominance between opinion leaders and the masses by (5) not being presented as fabricated—but as inevitable, natural, as the ultimate normative 6 framework, the “right” normative framework; and (6) find (or try to find) a way to perpetuate themselves so the status quo can be maintained. To be able to illustrate each condition with more clarity, I propose four different sets of beliefs which I will test against each condition: if the set of beliefs pass the condition, it will move forward; if not, that means that they are a non-ideological set of beliefs. The conditions will thus work as a filter to find out which set of beliefs could be analytically contended as ideological, or not. The four systems of beliefs I will use to contrast the proposed necessary jointly conditions proposed above are (1) common sense systems of beliefs (e.g. body hygiene) (2) education (3) Catholicism, and (4) racial naturalism. I want to make clear that I will touch just on the surface of these examples; because of the inherent controversy that some of these examples entail, I could just focus on one of these examples for the entire paper. Thus, these examples will work just as a guidance so the conditions can be better understood—not the set of believes themselves. So many assumptions will be made; trying, though, not to be disrespectful. Now, I start a detailed analysis condition by conditions or, if it make sense, by groups of conditions. Due to the causal relationship between condition one and two (that (1) interprets the world by predetermining what is good or bad which (2) transforms into a particular action or behavior), I choose to discuss them together. In sum, the first two conditions suggest that ideologies are charged with moral lenses which define what should be considered good or bad, right or wrong, in an a priori, moral form approach, which, after internalized will, in some extent, consequentially turn into actions. Extracted from a fragment of Riggs’ definition of ideology: 7 [An ideology] structures a person’s perceptions and predetermines his understandings of the social world, expressing these cognitions in characteristic symbols; it tells him whether what he ‘sees’ is good or bad or morally neutral; and it propels him to act in accordance with his cognitions and evaluations as a committed member of a political group in pursuit of definite social objectives. (Riggs 37) Many sets of beliefs satisfy these first two conditions, and the four examples (body hygiene, education, Catholicism, and racism) I offered are not an exception. The four of them offer a distinction between the good and bad and tell us through which actions we can achieve it: (1) to preserve body hygiene is good, and you obtain it through, for instance, showering; (2) to educate yourself is good and you can become educated through, for example, reading; (3) in the case of Catholicism, to follow the principles the Bible offers, it is necessary to have a good relationship with God and you should have such relationship if you want to go to heaven; and (4) in regard of racial naturalism, the core belief is that races can be ranked from higher to lower due to some embedded capacities related to race, and therefore they should be treated differently. Without more examination, it can be concluded that the four of them pass conditions 1 and 2 ((1) interprets the world by predetermining what is good or bad which (2) transforms into a particular action or behavior). Condition three (when such system of beliefs is embraced by the masses, (3) institutional entities are constructed and established at the heart of social reality to self-validate the original system of beliefs), on the other hand, is not as obvious nor easy to understand. Thus, a closer examination is needed before comparing it to the four sets of 8 belief offered. To Zizek, it is imperative to see “ideology in its externality, that is as a materiality of ideology” (Zizek 6). Zizek’s concept is inspired from Althusser’s notion of Ideological State Apparatuses (ISA). Althusser calls Ideological State Apparatuses “a certain number of realities which present themselves to the immediate observer in the form of distinct and specialized institutions” (17) which “function massively and predominantly by ideology” (19). Although condition three stems from Althusser’s ISA’s, to use it as a necessary condition would be too complex: ISA’s have a whole theoretical framework behind. So, for the purpose of this paper, condition three just entails that institutional entities based on the initial system of beliefs and therefore perform activities that are in line with the system of beliefs that created them in the first place, and that, through them, the originator system of beliefs self-validates itself. Contrasting this notion with the four sets of beliefs—(1) common sense systems of beliefs (e.g. body hygiene) (2) education (3) Catholicism, and (4) racial naturalism—the first one has not developed institutions in which such beliefs self-validate themselves. These beliefs tend to stay at the individual level; they might also be in a collective level in which the way you should take care of your body is developed in more detail but—in general—there seems to be not an institution that tries to self-validate such beliefs. Thereby, these set of beliefs do not pass condition three and therefore appears not to be an ideology. Regarding education, schools are the clear institutional entities from the notion that to educate your mind is a good thing (Althusser even classifies schools as ISA’s, see Althusser 17). Schools self-validate the belief that we should nourish our mind through education by exactly doing that, educating. There is no discussion that such institutions, 9 schools, have established themselves at the heart of social reality. These set of beliefs, then, pass to the next round of conditions. To analyze the system of beliefs related to religious beliefs, in this case Catholicism, Zizek says that Religious belief, for example, is not merely or even primarily an inner conviction, but the Church as an institution and its rituals… stand for the very mechanisms that generate it. When Althusser repeats… ‘Act as if you believe, pray, kneel down, and you shall believe, faith will arrive by itself’, he delineates an intricate reflective mechanism of retroactive, ‘autopoetic’ foundation that far exceeds the reductionist assertion of the dependence of inner belief on external behavior. That is to say, the implicit logic of his argument is, kneel down and you shall believe that you knelt down because of your belief—that is, your following the ritual is an expression/effect of our inner belief, in short, the ‘external’ ritual performatively generates its own ideological foundation (Zizek 7). Religion, in this case in the form of Catholicism, is therefore a clearer example of an institutional entity in which the system of beliefs self-validates itself, and it is also the cleanest example I can think of as a type of institution that has embedded itself at the heart of social reality. It can therefore pass to the next condition. The fourth set of beliefs, racial naturalism, also created official entities that focused on institutionalizing the belief that, biologically, there is a difference among races (i.e. some races are better than others). An example of institutions that represented such 10 system of beliefs were the institutions that prohibited the blacks from voting. Without getting into the question if such type of institutions still exist, it can be reasonably asserted that racial naturalism satisfies condition three. Note the relevance in the fact that these institutional entities based on a defined system of beliefs have to establish themselves at the heart of social reality. Cults might be one of the best examples to illustrate the reason why: many cults have created institutional entities but they are still not at the heart of the social reality in a large scale, and would therefore not pass condition three. Condition four (that the system of beliefs (4) create a social relationship of dominance between opinion leaders and the masses) is where the conversation gets controversial and conceptual definitions can change the way we perceive the remaining proposed system of beliefs: education, Catholicism, and racial naturalism. If we imagine an educational structure that does not impose a contained set of beliefs and that encourages “free speech, free thinking, free examination and questioning without restraint” (Castoriadis 113), or in other words that in which “everything becomes effectively an object of reasonable debate from which gains can be expected in all domains” (Castoriadis 75), then it can be solidly argued how this type of education would not create a relationship of domination between opinion leaders and the masses. I have to mention, however, that ideological education is imparted everyday around the world, possibly in every country. Nonetheless, the education that I have described would not satisfy condition four and therefore not continue the ideological test. To avoid controversy, for conditions four and five, I propose to analyze Catholicism in the middle ages. During this time, I think it can be unanimously agreed 11 that Catholicism was trying to create a relationship of dominance between the opinion leaders and the masses, that is, the opinion leaders spread the Catholic gossip to create a separation between the masses for their own benefit. Catholicism can therefore move to the second-to-last condition. Considering racism at any point in time, by definition of its own beliefs, it is creating a dominance between races—and it is not a surprise that the ones who spread the belief that some races are better than others pertain(ed) to the “higher” race(s). By believing that races can be ranked from better to worse, racism is already creating a hierarchical relationship of dominance between top and bottom. So, racism can also move to the fifth condition. Regarding condition five (that the system of beliefs is (5) not being presented as fabricated—but as inevitable, natural, as the ultimate normative framework, the “right” normative framework) Zizek alerts us that, if an ideology, the system of beliefs are “destined to convince us of its ‘truth’” (Zizek 6). There is no better way to present a system of beliefs as natural, than by convincing that a the given system of beliefs is ‘what is’ instead of ‘what has been constructed,’ which keeps the given ideology away from being seen as a social construction. Staying away from being seen as a social construction is critically important because, as Ian Hacking points out, framing a concept as socially constructed will eradicate seeing it as inevitable. Using Hacking’s work, he makes the argument that “social constructionists about X tend to hold that: (1) X need not to have existed, or need not be all as it is. X, or is at present, is not determined by the nature of things; it is not inevitable. Very often they go further, and urge that: (2) X is quite bad as it is [and] (3) we would be much better off if 12 X were done away with, or at least radically transformed” (Hacking 6). Thereby, ideological systems of beliefs present themselves as inevitable to avoid being seen as socially constructed, which, as Hacking brought to our attention, can end up creating a discomfort against any system of belief—and consequently start a movement of questioning. Religion, in the example of faith, is, by language, already defecting potential doubtfulness, because faith cannot be questioned. Natural racism, also by language, is using the word ‘natural’ to describe what nature defined for us, that there is an inherent natural racial inequality, and to spread such “fact” as externally created—not as socially constructed. Again, for the purpose of this paper, it can be reasonably asserted that both system of beliefs presented themselves as natural. The final condition, condition six (that ideologies (6) find (or try to find) a way to perpetuate themselves so the status quo can be maintained), is, therefore, the one that will decide whether or not racial naturalism and Catholicism should be considered ideologies by the proposed group of necessary conditions. In the case of racial naturalism, the mechanism of perpetuation was one of the most horrifying ones, slavery. Although violent and cruel, the system of beliefs which controlled the popular mind was so ingrained that brought us to act in such manner. The perpetuating mechanism, then, was violent and open to the public, which kept people away from trying to change it. Applying the same condition to Catholicism can be controversial to an extent; however, it is a historical fact that Catholicism has found a way to keep itself alive for thousands of years. By selling faith, which (as discussed before) excludes questioning and two extremely opposite ends after life, heaven and hell, Catholicism has found many 13 ways to make sure that the beliefs are passed from generation to generation—and has therefore kept itself alive. After going through the six conditions offered, I want to share that, initially, I had one extra condition: that the social domination between masses was achieved in a non-transparent way. Zizek argues that ideologies act this way and by non-transparency means having “a gap [that] separates its ‘official,” public meaning from its actual intention—that is to say, in which we are dealing with an unreflected tension between the explicit enunciated content of the text and its pragmatic presuppositions” (Zizek 6). In other words, that there is a gap between what the leaders enunciate and the intentions behind, that is, the leaders are lying to the public for a personal reason, which is normally for their own advantage. Both Catholicism and racial naturalism seem to satisfy such condition. Regarding Catholicism, the question is if what the religious leaders enunciate, which is to create a good relationship with God through the following of certain rules to go to heaven, is their actual intention; and without delving into the discussion, in the middle ages, the relationship seemed not to be transparent. Turning to racism, here we should ask ourselves if the public message, which is that we should treat races differently due to an inherent inferiority, and the actual intentions are the same. Despite all the arguments that can be made on this point, I would argue that racisms’ gap is the one that is between believing in a class separation and imposing this belief for the benefit of the people in the “better” class. Despite both Catholicism and racial naturalism presumably satisfying such condition, if we turn to Nazism there seems to be a problem: the gap between what Hitler 14 enunciated and the reasons why he enunciated them could be argued to be the same. If that would have been the case, the gap did not exist—he believed what he said and the reasons why he enunciated were aligned with such beliefs. Assuming this to be true, Nazism, in Zizek’s view, would not be considered an ideology, which therefore (by adding such condition as necessary) it becomes too narrow. After satisfying conditions one to six, I argue that both Catholicism and natural racism—insofar to the given propositions—can be considered ideologies at some point in time; and that neither body hygiene nor education, at least the type of education I proposed, are or can be considered an ideology. Finally, before raising arguments about the many conceptual definitions of the systems of beliefs offered, I want to reiterate that the objective was to understand the necessary conditions and the flow from first to last, not to depict the systems of beliefs themselves—they just served to illustrate the conditions. Now, after illustrating the conditions, I will perform the same process for Capitalism for which I will offer a more exhaustive description. Step 2: Is Capitalism and Ideology? After proposing a group of necessarily jointly conditions to discern if a system of beliefs is an ideology, I now need to perform the same task with capitalism. After offering a group of necessarily jointly conditions, I will go through the same process that I did with the four examples I used before— (1) common sense systems of beliefs (e.g. body hygiene) (2) education (3) Catholicism, and (4) racial naturalism—to analyze if capitalism 15 should or should not be counted as an ideology. In this case, however, the focus is not on the conditions anymore; it is on capitalism itself. For this task, we first need to investigate which system of beliefs construct capitalism. Before starting this endeavor though, I want to point out that the literature regarding capitalism is massive and widespread. There is no universally accepted definition for capitalism, not to say a group of beliefs, neither a unanimous agreement in regard of its origins. I also want to note that I am aware that, if we are talking about a system of beliefs, it might be more appropriate to talk about neoliberalism, because it is widely accepted that capitalism stems from it; and, I would argue that capitalism, really, is primarily a system of production exchange. For the objective of this paper, however, I find appropriate to avoid such conversation and treat capitalism as a carrier of a system of beliefs. Finally, I also want to emphasize that I use commonly accepted beliefs. Capitalism has taken shape in many forms, so I want to avoid bias towards capitalism itself by engaging, for instance, towards the type of rationale that Herbert Spencer endorsed capitalism with based on Social Darwinism, which can be seen as extremist (and it could be validly argued that capitalism is not acting in such a way). So, although “Spencer’s theory became most popular in the United States, where capitalist competition and ‘rugged individualism” had assumed exaggerated proportion” (Baradat 86), I try to stay into the commonly accepted boundaries of capitalism. For this endeavor, I use Political Ideologies: Their Origins and Impact by Leon P. Baradat as the main work from which I will pull most of the beliefs. Before laying out the beliefs, my first critique to Baradat is that he rapidly assigns Adam Smith with capitalism, 16 whilst many academicians focused on Smith’s work would agree that the original Smith’s conception of a “good” economic system are far too distant from the type of capitalism that we are currently experiencing. Maybe we are now experiencing neocapitalism; but surely, we should be skeptical when the concept of capitalism is rapidly linked to Smith’s work, who wrote The Wealth of Nations, but also The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Though, to deepen more in such discussion is irrelevant for the concerning topic of this paper. This said, I first want to use a standardized definition of capitalism. The Oxford English Dictionary defines it as an “economic system in which private capital or wealth is used in the production or distribution of goods and prices are determined mainly in the free market.” This definition, though, like any other definition, does not clearly expose the beliefs behind it. Here we are interested in knowing the system of beliefs that lie in the core of capitalism and have therefore shaped human thought to bring such economic system to existence. Remember that an ideology is made of a system of beliefs, thus the first step before we run through the six necessary conditions for a system of beliefs to be an ideology is to find out which beliefs compose capitalism. I argue that the system of beliefs that lie in the core of capitalism are the following: (1) “The wealth of nations is determined by their productivity” (Baradat 84) (2) “The distribution of wealth in an economy would be most healthy if left to the abstraction of the market forces” (Baradat 84) (3) It believes in atomism, that is, “it focuses on the individual, assuming that the social good is a coincidental result of individual success” (Baradat 85) 17 (4) Uninhibited competition will bring the most efficient outcome (e.g. establishing laissez-faire in which the government should impose a minimum economic policy). (Baradat 84) (5) “Although human labor created value, it was perfectly appropriate for those who controlled capital to force labor to surrender a large part of the value it created” (Baradat 85). Giving this system of beliefs, the next question is: “Is such system of beliefs ideological?” First of all, then, we need to refresh what are the necessarily jointly conditions, I proposed, for a group of beliefs to be an ideology: when it (1) interprets the world by predetermining what is good or bad which (2) transforms into a particular action or behavior. When such system of beliefs is embraced by the masses, (3) institutional entities are constructed and established at the heart of social reality to self-validate the original system of beliefs. Finally, ideologies (4) create a social relationship of dominance between opinion leaders and the masses by (5) not being presented as fabricated—but as inevitable, natural, as the ultimate normative framework, the “right” normative framework; and (6) find (or try to find) a way to perpetuate themselves so the status quo can be maintained. The exercise now is to put capitalism through every condition I proposed, as I did with the other systems of beliefs. Again, putting together conditions one and two ((1) interprets the world by predetermining what is good or bad that (2) therefore embraces a particular action or behavior) by definition a capitalistic economic system does both 18 interpret the world by predetermining what is good or bad (e.g. to increase productivity is good for the wealth of the nation) and therefore embraces a particular action or behavior: to leave the market alone so it can find the equilibrium point, where supply and demand meet, point in which the optimal price and quantity resides, and where highest production is yielded. Moving on to condition three (that when such system of beliefs is embraced by the masses, (3) institutional entities are constructed and established at the heart of social reality to self-validate the original system of beliefs) the Washington consensus can be used as a clear example of the institutional self-validation phenomena. Robert Hunter Wade explicitly informs us that “since the 1980s, these bodies [economic multilateral institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization] have been mandated by their member states to implement the Washington Consensus—to deregulate markets, privatize public enterprises, cut taxes and public spending, open up national economies to cross-border trade and investment…” (Wade 306). I stop here because the point is clearly made: the original system of beliefs is clearly reflected in Wade’s quote. Another self-validating mechanism is that we are measuring success through the gross domestic product (GDP). As Joseph A. Shumpeter points out, in his book Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, “a first test of economic performance is total output, the total of all the commodities and services produced in a unit of time—a year or a quarter of a year or a month” (Schumpeter 63). By doing so, the original belief that to produce more is good, is being self-validated by having institutionalized not just in physical institutional entity, but by creating an index that links successfulness with being 19 productive and instituting it as the ultimate successfulness measurements of the institutions themselves. Countries therefore strive to increase their GDP, because they assume that by doing so their wealth is increased, which is the ultimate goal. Condition three is therefore reasonably satisfied. Condition four (that ideologies (4) create a social relationship of dominance between opinion leaders and the masses) gives a lot of room to deepen into. Let me first reiterate that, in capitalism, “the general rule of progress requires that people should be left free to follow their natural inclinations” (Fortman 2); and it therefore strives to create such freedom. If left here, it seems that capitalism, by embracing freedom, is free of domination—but what type of freedom is capitalism promoting? If we treat freedom as an antagonistic concept to dominance, a very paradoxical comparison can be made. For this conversation I use Philip Pettit’s work. As he first reminds us The market is traditionally hailed as the very exemplar of a system under which people enjoy freedom, in particular the negative sort of freedom associated with liberal and libertarian thought: freedom as noninterference. But how does the market appear from the perspective of a rival conception of freedom [freedom as non-domination]…? (Pettit 132) To further pursue the answer to this question, Pettit distinguishes between two types of freedoms: ‘choice-based,’ which he defines as “freedom in the outright sense” and ‘chooser-based,’ which he defines as “freedom in the social sense” (Pettit 133, 134). To the distinction of these two types of freedom, Pettit (147) concludes that 20 From the perspective of this conception of freedom, it may be a very good thing that people’s choices are unobstructed and that the options between which people choose are increased and diversified… as the competitive market is said to ensure; this will improve the value of people’s social freedom… but the main issue within the conception of freedom as non-domination bears on the extent to which the market can respect and strengthen people’s social freedom as such… this is a separate issue, because a person’s choices might be unobstructed without the person having a high degree of social freedom; after all, the slave of the rich and kindly master may enjoy an enormous range of choice without having any social freedom whatsoever. Pettit is inferring that presumably the market is respecting the freedom as ‘noninterference,’ but that is not the case with freedom as ‘non-domination.’ Remember that one of the beliefs is that ‘unhindered competition’ creates a better outcome. I said that the comparison has paradoxical because if we “let freedom as non-domination be a central ideal in political life not only will it be likely to make a case for a variety of forms of regulation, it will also explain how regulation by a coercive state need not be viewed with quite the reluctance that other ideal [freedom as non-interference] would generate” (Pettit 147), which to an extent contradicts freedom as non-interference. The paradox is that by focusing on promoting just freedom as noninterference the system is also creating a relationship of domination (which is now better understood after, at least, acknowledging a difference between freedom as non-interference and as non-domination). The above example of freedom as non-domination is attributed to a macro-level model. I would also like to explore domination on a micro-level. For this, remember that I argue that in a capitalistic system “although human labor created value, it was perfectly appropriate for those who controlled capital to force labor to surrender a large part of the value it created” which is connected to the “iron law of wages, in which he [David 21 Ricardo] suggested that the owner of the factory and the machines would be driven by the profit motive to pay the workers only enough to bring them to the factory to work another day” (Baradat 85). This concept, by definition, entails domination by justifying the owner’s monetary control over the workers. Hence, in a capitalistic economic system, the individual experiences a domination relationship by both the macro and micro agents. In the macro level by promoting deregulation, which hinders the freedom as non-domination; and in the micro level, by asserting that profit seeking entails a domination relationship between owner and worker. Bringing this conversation back to condition 4 (that (4) create a social relationship of dominance between opinion leaders and the masses), on a macro level, the opinion leaders would be the politicians who spread the capitalistic beliefs and the masses the population who lose freedom as non-dominance; and in the micro level, the opinion leaders are the capital owners and the masses the working class. It then seems that the system of beliefs offered also satisfy condition four. Following, condition five (that (5) it is not being presented as fabricated—but as inevitable, natural, as the ultimate normative framework, the “right” normative framework) is one of the principal concerns, I would argue, shared by many academicians across disciplines. First of all, we have to understand that “conceiving economic relations in natural terms amounts to portraying them as a metabolism between man and nature, or, to take a less species-specific viewpoint, between living agents and the natural world they inhabit… recognizing that biologically limited agents are subject to this law of survival is one thing; taking it as the key to understanding an economy is another” (Winfield 1). Although, this point is concerned with what economics is in general, I argue 22 that capitalism has built from this same first notion, ‘the metabolism between man and nature,’ which Richard Dien Winfield finds already problematic, and, in my view, has added a whole system of beliefs on top of it. In the case of capitalism, Zizek also builds from Winfield’s notion to say that “the system production-nature (man’s productive-exploitative relationship with nature and its resources) was perceived as a constant, whereas everybody was busy imagining different forms of the social organization of production and commerce… [But] today… nobody seriously considers possible alternatives to capitalism any longer, whereas popular imagination is persecuted by the vision of the forthcoming ‘breakdown of nature’, of the stoppage of all life on earth—it seems easier to imagine the ‘end of the world’ than a far more modest change in the mode of production, as if liberal capitalism is the ‘real’ that will somehow survive even under condition of a global ecological catastroph…” (Zizek 2). Zizek asserts that after this realization “one can thus categorically assert the existence of ideology” (Zizek 2). It cannot be said in a clearer way: Capitalism wants to stay—and presenting itself as natural is a very efficient tactic. Then, the following question is: How has Capitalism found a way to solidify its roots in the system? Such question links with the last necessary condition, condition 6 (that (6) if capitalism is indeed an ideology, it has found, or tried to find, a way to perpetuate itself so the status quo can be maintained). Let us think about this in a simple causal and necessary relationship. Capitalism holds that wealth is directly connected to productivity, but after producing—to actually create wealth—something else has to happen: someone has to buy what has been produced. It is therefore necessary for a capitalistic economy to have consumers. Moreover, since to economically grow is a good thing, the more you 23 produce the better, which entails that your consumers, by necessity, also have to consume more. Then, since capitalism is the most predominant economic system in the world, we should wonder “How has capitalism done such thing, that is, to incentivize the consumer to buy, so more could be produced and, more importantly, sold?” To answer this question, I propose to understand desire first. To desire is part of human nature: we want stuff. Desire is the starting point for any economic transaction to happen: you desire something that somebody else has and is willing to sell, and that you are willing to pay for. Shortly, desire works this way: (1) you want something; (2) you analyze if it is available (that is, being able to purchase it and having the means); if it is, (3) belief is what can change your mind to not consume the desired good; if so, (4) you will try to find a substitute that aligns with those beliefs. A day-to-day example to illustrate this process is the following: (1) if you want chocolate cake, you open the fridge; (2) if you see that it is available, then (3) you analyze your beliefs towards eating chocolate cake (e.g. maybe not a great idea because you believe that it will cause pimples to arise—note that this can be true or untrue, but it still shapes your behavior); and (4) because of this belief, you decide to eat milk and cereal (for an in depth analysis, see Swinburne from 429 to 445). The key phenomenon, as Richard Swinburne points out, is that “when we resist our natural inclinations, we do so because we have reasons for action quite other than ones naturally described as the satisfaction of desire” (Swinburne 429); conversely, however, and this is what is important for our analysis, we can be more prone to our natural inclination if there is a belief that justifies to act in such a way. 24 Now that we have a general understanding of how desire works and how important beliefs are in the decision process before we decide whether to satisfy our desire, I would argue that the most coldhearted—and at the same time simplest—belief that capitalism has successfully programmed in our mind (by, for instance, manipulation through the media e.g. TV2) is that happiness and desire fulfillment are directly related: when you fulfill your desires, you will be happy or continue to be happy (which translates to the more you consume the happier you will be). Although such causal relationship is popularly held as true, “the happiness which comes from the satisfaction of a desire.... is very limited by its own nature to a comparatively short duration. For the satisfaction of one desire immediately gives rise to another, and so the moment of happiness ends in further anxiety” (Patanjali 161). Which, unfortunately, works in the capitalistic advantage: people, then, want to consume more and more, which keeps growth. I argue that such belief has been programed in our society through incepting consumerism as an essential part of our day to day life, which then labels us as consumers. “Consumerism refers to an attachment to purchasing goods not necessary for personal or familiar survival, and a value system that makes this attachment an important part of personal and social evaluation” (Stearns 62). To keep consumerism as an essential part of our life, capitalism keeps the system moving throughout the “Golden Arrow of Consumption” (Story of Stuff). By making you feel uncomfortable in your own skin, Capitalism tells you that if you do not own some type of goods or dress some type of way you are not enough, which translates to selling products whose value was socially 2 “Probably the most powerful weapon of the dominant producers lies in their use of television. To a greater degree than ever before a relative handful of products will share a monopoly of most of the leisure time of the American family.” (Lebow 2) 25 constructed through appearance, instead of real quality. As Annie Leonard, the leader of the “Story of Stuff” movement, points out: “this system was purposefully designed” and uses Victor Lebow’s quote which to portray capitalism’s consumerist intentions: Our enormously productive economy demands that we make consumption our way of life, that we convert the buying and use of goods into rituals, that we seek our spiritual satisfactions, our ego satisfactions, in consumption. The measure of social status, of social acceptance, of prestige, is now to be found in our consumptive patterns. The very meaning and significance of our lives today expressed in consumptive terms. The greater the pressures upon the individual to conform to safe and accepted social standards, the more does he tend to express his aspirations and his individuality in terms of what he wears, drives, eats- his home, his car, his pattern of food serving, his hobbies… What becomes clear is that from the larger viewpoint of our economy, the total effect of all the advertising and promotion and selling is to create and maintain the multiplicity and intensity of wants that are the spur to the standard of living in the United States (Lebow 3). To summarize the conversation related to condition six, I want to point out that ultimately, as As Herman E. Daly and Joshua Farley point out, “economics is about what we desire and what we’re willing to give up to get it.” (Daly and Farley 3). My argument is that capitalism is aware of this and therefore its perpetuation is focused on the manipulation of desire. This is not any surprising discovery; you just have to turn on your TV to experience it. Besides embedding consumerism into our daily life, I want to argue that Capitalism did not just find a way to perpetuate itself, but it also found a way not to be 26 questioned, which is, I would argue, what differentiates Capitalism from other ideologies. To understand how this works I want to link together the concept of freedom as non-interference, discussed in condition four, to this last condition. First of all, I would argue that when ideologies have been questioned and therefore faced has been in the point that the dominated masses have realized that they have lost freedom, which is seen as a basic human right. The masses have to feel encapsulated first, to try to escape the limits imposed by the ideological context in which they exist. Therefore, if the domination mechanism is clear for the population then the ideology is at risk, because the realization of social constructivism can come to place. For instance, racial naturalism dominative’s mechanism was to enslave the blacks; the blacks therefore could clearly see that their freedom was taken away, and that it hindered their option to flourish tremendously. Conversely, capitalism, as seen in condition 4, sells itself as the defender of freedom (as non-interference, but this is not commonly known). My argument here, is that capitalism has been able to perpetuate itself by being portrayed as being a non-dominative ideology. What makes this approach to perpetuation unique and, I would argue, highly efficient is that the masses do not feel enclosed because if there is something that capitalism protects it is “freedom.” Therefore, by subtly dominating the masses, capitalism has accomplished something that other ideologies did not: the masses are not compelled to question the system, because they are already “free.” Why would you rebel against someone who is preserving your freedom? 27 After the analysis, I contend that capitalism can be considered an ideology, which may not be a surprise for many. My aim is that now it is easier to understand why it is the most predominant economic system across nations, and, moreover, how it stays alive. The last topic I want to explore in this essay is, in case there is one, the antidote of ideology, and what would be some of the potential necessary conditions to conceive a non-ideological society. In this case, however, I will not aim to find a group of necessarily jointly condition; I just start a philosophical discourse. Step 3: The Autonomous Society The first relevant question to start the following discussion is, “must a new ideology be established to be able to transition from an old one?” Because, going back to the introduction of this essay, if we look back to history it seems that “the very gesture of stepping out of ideology pulls us back into it” (Zizek 5). Zizek has many reasons to claim such pattern: we have been bouncing from an ideological system of beliefs to another (the evidence seems robust). Also, we tend to go from pole to pole, from extreme to extreme (e.g. from the government should control everything, to the markets should control everything), which, after the antecedent system failed, serves as a reason to disprove it and impose a completely opposite one. In my opinion, the origin of this pattern is that the objective of “what is good” is pre-established before the start and then we obsessively pursue such pre-established “good objectives.” When you are blindly walking towards an objective, you can dismiss what happens on the way to the “ideal” state, which maybe should change the trajectory that the ideology (in whichever way is being manifested) is now undertaking. 28 In an ideological system of beliefs, therefore, there is no loop from the original system of beliefs to the consequences of encouraged actions back to beliefs—there is no feedback and a response to it. The following question, then, is “how come there is not?” But this question has been answered along the essay: ideologies structure themselves so they are not questioned; if they would be, then the status quo would be in danger. To break an ideology there has to be a loop in which the consequences of the actions are honestly measured: feedback is obtained, which then is used to reshape the original system of beliefs, time after time, to an ever ending process. To engage this concept in a philosophical manner, let me bring to the conversation Cornelius Castoriadis autonomy theory. “Autonomy [theory] is a way to continue the movement for human emancipation… In other words, the quest for human freedom is a social creation that is historically traceable, one that dies, springs up again, surviving up to nowadays in new forms. The autonomy proposal therefore is not a proposal for a new utopia; it expresses the germ of explicit and limitless questioning…” (Asara et al 226). To keep the same analytical flow, the task is now to connect the autonomy theory with the first necessary conditions for a system of beliefs to be ideology. So, let me first refresh them. I propose ideology to be a system of beliefs that (1) interprets the world by predetermining what is good or bad which (2) transforms into a particular action or behavior. When such system of beliefs is embraced by the masses, (3) institutional entities are constructed and established at the heart of social reality to self-validate the original system of beliefs. Finally, ideologies (4) create a social relationship of dominance between opinion leaders and the masses by (5) not being presented as fabricated—but 29 as inevitable, natural, as the ultimate normative framework, the “right” normative framework; and (6) find (or try to find) a way to perpetuate themselves so the status quo can be maintained. I therefore propose that the only continuous cycle in an autonomous society (using Castoriadis’ conception) is to flow from condition one to three to start back again. Tying this back to ‘dies and springs again,’ the process could be similar to the following: (1) the system of belief springs through actions: (2) it is critically observed (empirically and conceptually); (3) the feedback is analyzed and discussed, and, finally, (4) changes in the system of beliefs are implemented, to start back again to (1). The critical point is, then, to analyze our institutions, because through them the original system of beliefs is self-validated. Therefore, if change has to happen and the theoretical framework that the autonomy offers applied, we have to constantly revisit the functions we are ascribing our institutions with. Theoretically, this can be conceived but, in reality, “ideologies work as an iron closure of the sense of societies and of the rules of living together, thwart change and act as an impediment to the conscious questioning of institutions, which is required for autonomy” (Asara et al 226), which pulls us back to the enclosed ideological approach. Hence, theoretically, going from condition one to three is attainable; but, in practice, after acknowledging that ideological systems are structured to avoid change, the next philosophically captivating subject matter to investigate is the necessary conditions needed in a society to create such change. For this, I use Castoriadis’ book “Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy.” 30 To start developing “the social-historical project of (individual and social) autonomy” (Castoriadis 20), Castoriadis immediately delves into two other intertwined projects: philosophy and democracy. He conceptualizes them as “expressions, and central embodiment, of the project of autonomy,” and claims that “[d]emocracy is the project of breaking the closure at the collective level. [And] [p]hilosophy, creating self-reflective subjectivity, is the project of breaking the closure at the level of thought” (Castoriadis 21). Without explicitly saying ideology, I think it is reasonable to claim a conceptual interchangeability between closure and ideology. To explore more in depth the interconnections between autonomy and philosophy and democracy, Castoriadis says the following: Philosophy and democracy were born at the same time and in the same place. Their solidarity comes from the fact that both express the refusal of heteronomy--the rejection of the claims to validity and legitimacy of rules and representations just because they happen to be there, the refusal of any external authority (even, and especially, “divine”), of any extra social source of truth and justice, in brief, the putting into question of existing institutions and the assertion of the capacity of the collectivity and of thought to institute themselves explicitly and reflectively. To put it in another way: the struggle for democracy is the struggle for the self-government. As the aim of self-government is not to accept any external limits, true self-government entails explicit self-institution, which presupposes, of course, the putting into question of the existing institution—and this, in principle, at any time. The project of collective autonomy means that the collectivity, 31 which can only exist as instituted, recognizes and recovers its instituting character explicitly, and questions itself and its own activities” (Castoriadis 20). As he emphasizes, we have to be able to recognize first, which consequently means that the first change has to happen in the individual level of thought, “because people do not wish to depart from settled habits of thought” (Castoriadis 64). Philosophy is then a critical part within an autonomic society. But what kind of philosophy? Castoriadis understands philosophy as “a reflective activity that deploys itself both freely and under the constraint of its own past. Philosophy is not cumulative—but it is deeply historical” (Castoriadis 18). He is suggesting a philosophy in which “everything becomes effectively an object of reasonable debate” (Castoriadis 75). Linking this back to being able to recognize, the individuals would therefore question the system of beliefs in which they are coexisting, because then a “philosophical discussion starts” in which “unrestricted thinking is the way of entering upon problems and tasks” (Castoriadis 83). Entailed in this mesh, there has to be a reinjection of curiosity in our educational system. There is now an intellectual passivity that seems to be spreading among the new generations—which translates to an education of indifference. A potential reason for this phenomenon, in my opinion, is that we are now so focused on the positive side of academics, that the normative side is being forgotten; and, by engaging with Castoriadis we are reminded that every social science is founded on normative claims. Once curiosity is reinstituted into education, “this interest [of constant emancipatory movement] starts feeding on what becomes our unquenchable thirst for knowledge per se. This thirst 32 is one of the manifestations of our freedom, or autonomy: we constantly put into question the inherited (be it “scientific” or “philosophical”) representation of what there is, we constantly shake the walls of our own closure” (Castoriadis 39). Castoriadis is asking for a new approach to education, where we also see the connection from the individual to the collective. As stated in the beginning, philosophy and democracy are both the creator and result of the project of autonomy. It is thus necessary that a connection is made from both, from individual to collective. To this Castoriadis proposes that “[o]nly the education (paideia) of the citizens as citizens can give valuable, substantive content to the ‘public space.’ This paideia is not primarily a matter of books and academic credits. First and foremost, it involves becoming conscious that the polis is also oneself and that its fate also depends upon one’s mind, behavior, and decision; in other words, it is participation in political life” (Castoriadis 113). This type of paideia brings us to discuss the democratic that would be potentially produced in the autonomy project. Castoriadis’ paideia is meant to engage the citizenry not through “passive ‘rights,’ but active general participation in public affairs. This participation is not left to chance, but actively promoted both through formal rules and through the general ethos of the polis,” (Castoriadis 106) which is the first necessary step towards direct democracy. If the citizenry becomes fully engaged, then (in a direct democracy) the people replace representatives and experts, and the community becomes the state. Hence, the only constant germ is just one. “The historical instituting process: the activity and struggle around the change of the institutions, the explicit (even if partial) self-institution of the polis as a permanent process” (Castoriadis 105). Finally, 33 the culmination of this process [philosophy and democracy] is the project of setting up an autonomous society: that is to say, a society capable of explicitly self-instituting itself, capable therefore of putting into question its already given institutions, its already established representation of the world (Castoriadis 136). Conclusion As discussed above, philosophy, the one in which the only constant is ‘limitless questioning,’ is an indispensable part of the individual and therefore collective autonomy project. If we do not engage to such philosophy, what is “indeed taking place, is that genuine philosophical questions get buried deeper and deeper under a thick layer of a quiet and soft dogmatism of positivistic metaphysics” (Castoriadis 26). Castoriadis attributes to Plato the one “who inaugurates the era of philosophers who wriggle out of the city, but who, as possessors of the truth, want to dictate to it laws while completely ignoring people’s instituting creativity and, at the same time being politically impotent, have as their supreme ambition to become counselors to the prince” (Castoriadis 8). Plato’s allegory of the cave is the illustration to such move, and his work could be argued to be one of the first ideological frameworks. In its face, it satisfies every condition: it is a system of beliefs that pre-defines what is good or bad, calls for particular action, structures institutions that self-validate such beliefs, creates a relationship of dominance between the opinion leaders and the masses, presents itself as natural, and creates a perpetuating mechanism. If the allegory ought to change, the potential philosophers kings should look behind when they are about to escape the cave, and 34 realize that what put all of them in the cave was just another ideological system of beliefs, and that they are about to create another one. I think that philosophically, the proneness to ideology tells one particular thing: we do not like uncertainty about the future; we like assurance about how we should behave now and where we are going. Whichever the ideology is, it keeps us in a box. In the case of capitalism, by deinstitutionalizing curiosity and keeping us boringly occupied from the paideia that Castoriadis proposes, and keep us focused on consuming—but every ideology has its own box. The project of autonomy has ingrained in its core that “there is not and cannot be a rigorous and ultimate foundation of anything—not of knowledge itself, not even of mathematics” (Castoriadis 87). If you imagine the box floating in the space, to get rid of ideology means to consciously vanish the box, which means that now you are free falling in space. There is no pre-destination, no set-and-stone rules, and this can be very scary: you are now completely enabled to engage radical imagination and participate in the creation of society—and ideological systems of beliefs have purposively programed us not to be comfortable in such position. Limitlessly continuing to self-create oneself entails uncertainty of what is, should, and will—because no ultimate foundation means that there is never a reaffirmation that what you are doing is what is “good” or what you “should,” and that creates deep intellectual discomfort, which links back to Zizek’s critic of the “dependence of inner belief on external behavior” (Zizek 7). Oppositely, limitless intellect can wonder, critic, and propose anything; but first it must get rid of the limits that have been imposed to it, which means to leave the comfort zone in which has probably both born and developed, a zone of comfort that it has externally been defined, so now you just must follow—not create. As Castoriadis proposes, 35 [i]t is only insofar as the radical imagination of the psyche seeps through the successive layers of the social armor, which over and penetrate it up to an unfathomable limit-point, and which constitute the individual, that the singular human being can have, in return, an independent action on society (Castoriadis 146). Castoriadis is not offering us a blueprint utopia, since it is now clear that by doing so he would contradict the project of autonomy itself. He is instead proposing a thought transformation to get rid of the ideological context that is hindering the necessary constant emancipation to reinvent society. He also acknowledges that such process “works by starting from something already instituted and on the basis of what is already there” (Castoriadis 150). I do not think that he would agree with getting rid of the capitalistic ideology to impose another one. If limitless questioning is instituted amongst our society, questions would arise concerning the one we are experiencing right now and the collective would start to shape it. Going back to the definition of capitalism, it asserts that most services and goods should be distributed by private entities; now, the question is “how is leaving most of goods to be distributed by the market working for the majority? Should the distribution of every good be privatized? Or should they not? For Castoriadis only universal cognitive ability that should be fostered is the one that always “opens up questions and which does not go without question” (Castoriadis 139). What happens from there, is unknown, uncertain; it will not get us closer to a pre-constructed societal ideal, because there is no such ideal. It consists of a process that 36 constantly reproduces itself in which the collective has something to say, because it recognizes its power to transform. 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