Toward an Inclusve Ethic of Difference: An Alternative Approach to Animal Rights

Dean 1 Toward an Inclusive Ethic of Difference: An Alternative Approach to Animal Rights Hannah Dean Senior Research April 18, 2016 Dean 2 Introduction Within the realm of discussions about animal rights, there are a variety of different approaches that proceed from equally different principles. One such approach is the utilitarian view taken up by Peter Singer. I critique Singer on the grounds that his argument for equal consideration for nonhuman animals is founded upon analogy and attempts to liken animals to humans. I do not want to dismiss Singer's arguments altogether but rather, I think that they could be much better. Ecofeminism provides a much needed insight to the conversation insofar as it is heavily reliant upon an ethic of care that is attentive to justice for dependent beings. In the same vein, phenomenology is incredibly important because it allows us to look at individual experiences (human or animal) and understand that they can all be meaningful. Essentially, my thesis is that animals have no need to exhibit any likeness to humans in order for their lives to be viewed as valuable. Rather, there is something inherently good about difference that can be discovered though a phenomenological look into animal rights. In considering our moral community, we have a moral obligation to take a step back from ascribing a human-centered view to the rest of creation and rather, understand other animals and people on their own terms; embracing the goodness that difference has to offer.1 This conversation carries with it a sense of urgency, due to the Anthropocene nature of humanity's influence on the earth.2 In what follows, I will consider the anthropocentric approach that necessitates a reworking of animal rights with regard to difference, I will show the importance of attempting to understand specific experiences though phenomenology, I will explain why difference is inherently good, I 1 Aside from a purely normative claim, my argument also has an epistemological component. In using phenomenology and difference our way of knowing animals can be better. Currently, our ways of knowing animals subject them to violence, and an epistemology that appeals to phenomenology and difference can perhaps fix this. However, for the sake of this paper; I will not explore this here. 2 Erle Ellis, "Anthropocene," ed. Jay Gulledge. September 3, 2013. http://www.eoearth.org/view/article/150125 Dean 3 will provide an overview of Singer's argument and will exemplify the aforementioned approaches by providing an ecofeminist critique of Singer, and lastly, will treat a potential objection to my argument. Taking Off Our Anthropocentric Goggles In understanding why we need an alternative approach to animal rights that it attentive to difference, it is important to look at past approaches that take up an anthropocentric view. In Daniel Quinn's Ishmael, the main character finds in the newspaper, a peculiar advertisement stating " TEACHER seeks pupil. Must have an earnest desire to save the world. Apply in person."3 As the narrator's journey continues, he finds that the teacher who put up this add is none other than a Gorilla, however, this Gorilla is incredibly wise and can telepathically communicate as if speaking one's own language. In what follows, Ishmael will cause the narrator to throw off most of the beliefs he once held as truth. One that I see to be particularly important is the "creation myth" that is typically told to justify human's mastery over nature. Ishmael explains this by taking up an example of a Jellyfish. He explains that at some point, millions of years ago an anthropologist was walking along a beach and came into contact with a single jellyfish sitting along the shore. The jellyfish introduced itself as the utmost pinnacle of the evolutionary process, proudly expressing " but finally Jellyfish appeared!".4 Ishmael uses this anecdote to expose the way that humans typically talk about themselves. We tend to act as though creation was all leading up to the emergence of humans. Essentially, "when man finally appeared, creation came to an end, because its objective had been reached. There was nothing 3 Daniel Quinn. Ishmael. (New York: Bantam/Turner Books, 1995), 4. 4 Ibid., 56. Dean 4 left to create."5 It is almost as if, on this view, all of creation was made for humanity alone. Ted Toadvine reconciles this by explaining that The jellyfish conclusions are intended to strike the reader as absurd, since the process of speciation has not stopped in the meantime; in retrospect, the jellyfish is only one species among many. But, according to Ishmael, humans are in no better a position to draw such a conclusion about their own place in the evolutionary process.6 When we take a moment and consider our being in the world, we can come to the realization that it is founded upon complete and utter contingency. Taking up an anthropological standpoint, it is by mere chance that this world happened to be the way that it is. In the same vein, it is completely contingent that humans are the way that they are and have the capabilities that they do. I find it surreal and humbling that there are a million different ways of being, but it seems as though we typically privilege one particular way of being. Religion along with philosophy have often been used to justify this. Due to this, I agree with Toadvine and Quinn that humans should not be seen as the culmination of evolutionary processes. We are but one organism, in relation with millions of others who all have meaningful experiences. However, current ideas about meaning do not really justify this.7 On my view, humans tend to enframe the world solely with themselves in mind. It is almost as if we are stuck in a process of wearing "anthropocentric goggles" that only reflect ourselves no matter where we look. This seems to occur in two very distinct ways. First of all, these 5 Ibid., 57. 6 Ted Toadvine, "How Not to be a Jellyfish" In Phenomenology and the Non-Human Animal. Ed. Christian Lotz & Corinne Painter (Springer, 2007) 39-55. 7 Although I love the perspective that Quinn provides ala Ishmael, I do want to posit one important thought about anthropomorphism. Although Ishmael is a novel that gets this very conversation going, I think it can be argued that the anthropomorphized Gorilla makes people open their eyes because she is anthropomorphized. We want Ishmael to have moral standing, because she is (aside from just being a Gorilla) so much like us. She is able to communicate telepathically through a sort of proto-language and additionally is seen as rational. It is not admirable to extend care to someone who is quite similar to you. We depict animals as rational, sensitive creatures in order for them to teach us something but they are valuable in their own right. They do not need to bear any likeness to us at all to be worthy of moral consideration. Consider how different humans are from one another. Just because we are Being in different ways does not mean that some ways of being are more valuable than others. Dean 5 "goggles" allow us to reflect ourselves insofar as we see particular things only by their usefulness to humans. This is perhaps an obvious outcome from wearing such "anthropocentric goggles" but I feel it needs to be acknowledged. Drawing from Heidegger, it is almost as though we have framed the world as standing reserve because we think all things were made for us; which on my view is quite a ridiculous conclusion.8 Second, these hypothetical glasses cause us to expect that experience in general can only be understood in terms of a human subject. For example, we go out into the world and look for similarities in us in order to attribute value. Value therefore is no longer inherent but is granted on a like-us basis. We may say that particular animals are valuable because they can express empathy, they are intelligent, they have families and social groups much like we do, or even that they, like us, have the capacity to suffer. I think that this is wrong. On my view, value is inherent to all life, and should be applied equally. We need to step away from privileging one particular way of being over others because ultimately, this is arbitrary. My argument is that placing value even in situations of complete and utter difference is still important and that ultimately, difference is valuable. Although in some ways animals do resemble humans, there are almost innumerable ways in which they are different. This does not at all mean that their experiences are not valuable or meaningful. Additionally, this does not justify the hierarchical lens that we typically take up when considering other species. I think that we as humans overlook the meaningfulness of animals' experiences because they do not match up to our own conceptions of the meaningful. The differences that we take to be enormous perhaps do not mean what we think they do. Instead, I think we need to attempt to understand animals on their own terms. 8 Martin Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology" from Basic Writings, rev. Edu. (New York, HarperCollins [1993] 2008), 309. Dean 6 A Turn to Phenomenology Traditionally, we have failed to take into account that animal experiences, albeit different that ours, can still have value. If we are to embrace an ethic of difference, we must first begin to understand the phenomenal aspects of such differences. On my view, phenomenology can add perspectives to the conversation that attempt to understand animals on their own terms, embedding their lives in a world that we too are embedded in. Drawing from Heidegger, one thing that phenomenology allows us to do is "to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself."9 Although Heidegger himself did not think animal lives were meaningful and involved in an attunement to experience and possibility that human lives are, he paved the way for another thinker who does leave room for animals within his own phenomenological context.10 This thinker is Maurice Merleau-Ponty. In his Nature lectures, Merleau-Ponty explicitly approaches the animal question on a phenomenological basis. Merleau-Ponty considers the lives of higher animals to interact with the world and are beings who have a world in the first place. "In the arena of higher animals, the Umwelt is no longer a closing-off, but rather an opening".11 Merleau-Ponty uses Uexkull's umwelt to consider the animal's being in the world. Much like Heidegger's use of "world" when considering Dasein, Merleau-Ponty takes up the umwelt to consider the meaningfulness of experiences in connection to one's environment. Remarking on the umwelt, Merleau-Ponty asserts that the exterior world exists only partes extra partes; it would engender the whole of behavior by the summation of elements. But each of its elements is in no way the only one possible. It is necessary that the whole is taken into account. Taken in isolation, 9 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time. (New York: Harper, 1962), 43. 10 Martin Heidegger. "The Animal is Poor in the World" in Animal Philosophy: Essential Readings in Continental Thought. ed. Calarco, Matthew, and Peter Atterton (London: Continuum, 2004.), 17 11Maurice Merleau-Ponty. 2003. Nature: Course Notes from the College de France. (Northwestern University Press, 2003), 171. Dean 7 moreover, it is useless; it realizes a vital adaptation only as an element of a whole. The arrangement of an umwelt thus cannot be a fortuitous arrangement.12 Merleau-Ponty claims that in considering the world, each of its parts (beings) is only one potential way of being. There are various ways in which one can find themselves in the world, being along the way. Each of these parts cannot be ripped from its surrounding environment, embedded in experience. We need to look at animal experience as a whole in attempting to understand animals on their own terms. On Kelly Oliver's reading of Merleau-Ponty, "man and animal are different, even dissonant parts of the same tune."13 They are both being within a world, just in different ways. Further, we loose a sense of value and important for these differences when we attempt to only seek harmony. What Merleau-Ponty is up to in these writings is essentially, employing phenomenology to uncover animal lives. While someone such as Heidegger may see an animal phenomenology as disenchanting human life, because it eliminates something we have traditionally ascribed only to humans; Merleau-Ponty may see it as a reenchanting of nature. In addressing the need for his specific approach, Merleau-Ponty urges his readers not to fall into previous patterns of animal analysis that foreclose opportunities and obscure rather than solve the problem. He maintains that "In the living organism, we must neither "platonize" or "aristotelianize" and double the reality under our eyes without resolving the problem".14 What he is saying here is that previous dominant views of animals do not get to the root of what we are trying to figure out. If we "platonize" a living organism we double the reality we are dealing with insofar as we now have ideals and forms to worry about investigating in addition to what is before our very eyes. Similarly "artistotlianizing" an organism involves claiming something about its essence, qualities, 12 Ibid., 175. 13 Kelly Oliver, "Strange Kinship: Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty on Animals" In Animal Lessons: How They Teach Us to Be Human. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009.), 210 14Merleau-Ponty. Nature. 155 Dean 8 and future iteration thus denying it possibilities.15 Much like Heidegger speaks of Dasein's having a future, Merleau-Ponty seems to argue that nonhuman animals are similarly open to futures and possibilities as well. Their being does not need to be understood solely on lack but rather on potential. He maintains that for the living organism "each present moment is supported by a future larger than any future".16 By this view, we cannot look to an organism and already know what its life will be like. It is open to a future and has the potential of being in a variety of different ways. I think the reason that Merleau-Ponty sees space for animals where someone like Heidegger sees clutter has a lot to do with their varieties of phenomenology. For Heidegger, experience requires a human observer. Dasein is hinged upon the back of understanding oneself distinctly within a world and being the sort of being that can question being in the first place.17 For Merleau-Ponty however, the body is more closely related to phenomenal experience. The body, in this way, is the vehicle by which one is being in the world.18 If this is the case, animals can have this too. They have some notion of interiority; touching, being touched, and moving along within an environment.19 According to Merleau-Ponty this is distinguished among lower and higher animals. In consider lower animals, Merleau-Ponty takes up the example of a sea urchin who, although living within an environment, responds to it in ways that only benefit itself; if responding can be thought to occur at all. Ultimately, "it lives truly as if there were only a world and only an urchin."20 Higher animals however, develop a "reply to the exterior world".21 In this case, the animal reserves agency within its world and has a being that is constantly shaped by a 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid., 155. 17 Heidegger, Being and Time. 33. 18 Monika M. Langer, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception: A Guide and Commentary. (Tallahassee: Florida State University Press, 1989) 19 Oliver "Strange Kinship," 218. 20 Merleau-Ponty, Nature. 171 21 Ibid., 170-171. Dean 9 possible future. Although I agree with much of what Merleau-Ponty is saying, I object to the different treatment Merleau-Ponty gives to these different organisms. I see these as differences in degree not kind. I support difference in kind because it allows us to be open to more potential ways of being. However, I am weary of an approach that looks solely to differences in degree. In doing so, we may fall back into the pattern of measuring animals up to humans which is essentially what I am arguing against. Additionally, even measuring animals up to other animals tends to privilege some particular ways of being over others and keeps in place a hierarchy among species. Ultimately, I find it important that Merleau-Ponty reserves space for animals within his phenomenological approach. Similarly, Thomas Nagel in "What is it Like to Be a Bat?" asserts that the subjective experience of one's being should ultimately be privileged over a purely objective approach. Although Nagel is explicitly drawing out this discussion to make a point about the way consciousness is typical addressed, his assertions have phenomenological implications. Nagel explains that current materialist reductionist arguments that attempt to explain consciousness in an objective manner are missing something important. He take up the challenge of understanding what it is like to be another organism to show that such an understanding is not available through a purely objective lens. Although science may be able to tell us a lot about consciousness, it fails to get at what it is actually like to be from the other's point of view.22 Nagel uses the example of a bat, perhaps because this animal is entirely different from humans in innumerable ways. Aside from the fact that bats can fly and live in environments differently than humans do, Nagel addresses their way of viewing the world, through their use of sonar, as inaccessible to humans. He explains that "Bat sonar, though clearly a form of 22 Thomas Nagel. "What is it like to be a bat?" in Mortal Questions. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979) 165 Dean 10 perception, is not similar in its operation to any sense that we possess, and there is no reason that it is subjectively like anything we can experience of imagine."23 In speaking of an organism's conscious experience, we are alluding to the fact that there is a particular sense in which being that organism is like, even if this cannot be traversed by us (as in the example of the bat), the organism's experience is still meaningful.24 Nagel goes farther is addressing that we should not put our own, obscured human views into the conversation in attempting to mediate what a particular organism's experience is like because at the end of the day, such an account is unavailable. "Insofar as I can imagine this (which is not very far), it tells me only what it would be like for me to behave as a bat behaves. But that is not the question. I want to know what it is like for a bat to be a bat."25 To me, this sounds much like the phenomenological aspect Heidegger was looking toward in letting something be seen from itself in the way it presents itself. Even if the animal may not be able to phenomenally appear to us, we can take this as necessitating an attunement to difference; even though such specific differences may not be accessible to the human subject. What Nagel is speaking to here is the importance of individual points of view. I maintain that this entails normative importance insofar as we should attempt to understand the animal on its own terms, even if such an understanding in inaccessible, because it will lead to a morally sound approach to animal rights. The Inherent Goodness of Difference In developing a more inclusive way of speaking about animal rights, we should refrain from taking on a view that still places humans at the center, and privileges some ways of being over others. Rather, I argue that difference is inherently good. I do not think that approaches that liken 23 Ibid., 168. 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid., 169. Dean 11 animals to humans or even approaches that reserve moral standing for animals that already resemble humans in some way (higher apes, dolphins, elephants) are performing something novel and charitable. It is easy to extend consideration to those who resemble us, but a true act of inclusivity is extending consideration even in cases of complete and utter difference. In any case, difference can be a good thing that allows us to look more closely, through a phenomenological lens, at the entity which we are concerned with. In his famous work "Différance", Jacques Derrida explicitly addresses the role of difference in a variety of ways, namely, with regard to our use of language. The mode of deconstruction that Derrida takes up in most of his writings can perhaps be said to be an embrace of difference on its own. Through deconstruction, Derrida is trying to get us to see is that the binaries we typically use to frame our world do not do us much good. Binaries such as human/animal or even abled/disabled tend to privilege one end while obscuring the other. Rather, what we need is a mode of thinking and speaking that take up a both/and approach.26 Such an approach attempts to rid us of these binaries and sees both ends of the couple as equally important, albeit different.27 In "Différance", Derrida is explicitly speaking to the importance of difference. In attempting to throw off a metaphysics of presence that has typically been asserted in ancient ontology, Derrida provides an ontology of difference. Différance is unique insofar as in the French language it sounds exactly the same as Difference, the true difference between the terms can only be discerned through looking at writing. Additionally, such a term captures both the idea of "differing" insofar as something can differ from another but also captures "to defer" insofar as 26 Derrida, Jacques. "Différance" in The Continental Philosophy Reader, edited by Richard Kearney and Mara Rainwater. (Routledge, 1996) 27 Hall, Melinda. "Notes on Jacques Derrida." (Stetson University: DeLand, FL. 2015) Dean 12 meaning is deferred according to Derrida's mode of deconstruction.28 Derrida claims that "As distinct from difference, différance thus points out the irreducibility of temporalizing. Différance is not simply active; it rather indicates the middle voice, it precedes and sets up the opposition between passivity and activity."29 On my reading of Derrida, what he is addressing here is that différance can help us uncover something that has been previously lost via the rejection of alterity or "otherness". If we are to embrace difference through his concept of différance, we have the potential to reconceptualize the way we frame our world. Essentially, "what we note as Différance will thus be the movement of play that "produces" these differences, these effects of difference."30 Later in this work, Derrida references Emmanuel Levinas with regard to his articulation of trace. He says that "A past that has never been present: with this formula Emmanuel Levinas designates the trace and the enigma of absolute alterity, that is, the Other."31 I agree with Derrida's assertion that Levinas' "other" is expressive of alterity and difference. I see "the Other" to capture a sort of turn to the possibilities of living within a world of being. According to Levinas, "The notion of the face... opens other perspectives: it brings us to a notion of meaning prior to my Sinngebung and thus independent of my initiative and my power."32 What I take Levinas to be saying is that in looking at another's face, we experience a sort of move toward morality. Such a move requires a unique attunement to difference which transcends our own experiences in favor of understanding "the Other". The "other's" face seems to elicit in one 28 Derrida. "Différance" 29 Ibid., 441. 30 Ibid., 449. 31 Ibid., 458. 32 Emmanuel Lévinas . "The Face of the Other" in Totality and Infinity; an Essay on Exteriority. (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1969) Dean 13 responsibility even in the face of complete and utter difference.33 In this case, difference carries with it a normative aspect, but we have to see difference and allow it to appear to us in order to get there. When remarking on the face of the animal other in an interview, Levinas states "I don’t know if a snake has a face. I can't answer that question. A more specific analysis is needed."34 What I take Levinas to be saying here is that a hypothetical encounter cannot be privileged in this sense. It is almost as if he is asserting an "I'll know it when I see it" type of view to considering the animal as other. He does not want to hastily generalize that maybe the snake does not have a face, without having phenomenally encountered it himself. I think Levinas is correct in refraining from passing judgement until he has actually experienced the face of the animal other. However, in my encounters with animals, I do see the notion of their "faces" as a move toward morality. For example, when I look into the eyes of my cat I can feel someone looking back at me. He often looks to me "meowing" and I feel within me a responsibility to figure out what he wants. Often times my attempts are unsuccessful, and this exemplifies the difference that I find to be so important. Ultimately, I think in this way, Levinas' idea of the face can be applied to animals. Singer's Arguments In "All Animals are Equal...", Singer offers an argument that claims we should extend moral consideration to nonhuman animals. By working through the consequentialist framework of utilitarianism he considers sentience an important criteria in assessing moral consideration and builds his argument heavily upon this concept. He begins by explaining what exactly he means 33 Emmanuel Lévinas, "The Face" in Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo, trans. Richard A. Cohen (1985) 34 Lévinas, Emmanuel. "The Name of a Dog, or Natural Rights" in Animal Philosophy: Essential Readings in Continental Thought. ed. Calarco, Matthew, and Peter Atterton (London: Continuum, 2004) 49. Dean 14 by moral consideration and exemplifies that this does not necessitate equal rights ultimately, because some rights are of no use to different species. "Since dogs can't vote it is meaningless to talk to talk of their right to vote."35 Rather, he proposes that extending a basic principle of equality to species other than humans is what he is aiming for; this does not mean equal treatment will ensue but rather, equal consideration. Proceeding from this initial discussion of moral consideration, Singer considers the different criteria that we currently use to extend moral consideration to humans. He considers several different aspects and takes into account how they may fall short insofar as some humans do not have them. Just because someone is a human, we allow that they merit moral importance but allowing that only humans deserve this on the basis of their species seems, to Singer, capricious. Consistently, Singer accuses this view of taking up a sort of speciesism (rightly so) and determines that this criteria alone misses the mark. By going back to the drawing board, Singer considers different qualities that we currently use to allot moral standing. In considering all of the different criteria one may use, it is likely that there are some humans who do not have these qualities. For example, he considers one's intelligence as a criteria for moral worth. Singer explicitly draws out an instance in which IQ scores could potentially be indicative of one's moral standing. However, by this view those with a score less than 100 may be subject to unequal treatment. He also considers examples within the realm of racism and sexism that prove a similar point, namely, that "equality is a moral idea, not an assertion of fact. There is no logically compelling reason for assuming that a factual difference in ability between two people justifies any difference in the amount of consideration we give to their needs and interests."36 Essentially, choosing to place moral worth on a supposed quality that some humans may have will in turn, 35 Peter Singer. "All Animals are Equal" in Writings on an Ethical Life. (New York: Ecco Press, 2000) 29 36 Ibid., 31. Dean 15 justify unequal treatment in some cases. In attempting to find a new criterion, Singer turns to the work of utilitarian philosopher Jeremey Bentham. Bentham, whose utilitarianism asserts "Each to count for one and none for more than one" leaves with Singer an assertion by which we should not count the interests of some beings more heavily than others.37 Thus, in taking interests into account, we must consider the interests of everyone, not just a select few who meet a pre-established criteria of moral standing. Following Bentham, Singer considers the ability to suffer a tale tell sign for a beings having interests and consequently, moral worth. From here, Singer makes sentience and the ability to suffer his criteria for moral standing and explains that since animals have this, they deserve moral consideration. He elicits a variety of instances to exemplify that animals can, indeed suffer and in turn explains why this is such an important quality. Singer claims that "The capacity for suffering and enjoyment is a prerequisite for having interests at all, a condition that must be satisfied before we can speak on interests in a meaningful way."38 Ultimately, if a being can suffer they can at the very least have some interests, insofar as they may desire to avoid unnecessary suffering. By this principle, Singer draws out normative claims that contribute to our moral obligations to nonhuman animals which require us to "extend our moral circle" so it includes them thus no longer engaging in exploitive practices such as eating meat.39 The "Like Us" Problem In considering why an ethic of difference is needed, I see it important to consider ecological approaches that already appeal to difference in order to get this conversation going. Ecological Feminism is one such approach. According to Carol Adam, ecofeminism opens the space for an 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid., 34. 39 Ibid. Dean 16 ethic of care that has a specific attunement to the "other" which is not limited to the human other.40 She explains that "Animals are part of nature. Ecofeminism posits that the domination of nature is linked to the domination of women and that both dominations must be eradicated."41 On this view, eliminating the domination of animals in a patriarchal capitalist society is part of the ecofeminist agenda. In this spirit of an ecofeminist approach, I find Singer's utilitarian argument inadequate. First of all, following an approach offered by Katherine Mackinnon and Deane Curtin, I think that what Singer is doing here is constructing an argument by analogy. Although MacKinnon does not explicitly address Singer, she offers a feminist approach to the animal rights debate. She asserts that the primary model of animal rights to date – one that makes animals objects of rights in standard liberal moral terms- misses animals on their own terms, just as the same tradition has missed women on theirs. If this is right, seeking animal rights on the 'like us' model of sameness may be misconceived, unpersuasive, and counterproductive.42 Deane Curtin43 expresses a similar sentiment. She critiques the notion of "extending" moral standing that is presented consistently by Singer44. She maintains that "some non-human others are 'subjects of life' if they are sufficiently like human beings in their ability to be self-conscious, rational beings. Rights are directed at humans, or more precisely, persons. Others get moral standing by analogy to us."45 I agree with both of these assertions because Singer is failing to understand animals on their own terms. He isn't granting them moral consideration because they 40 Carol Adams. "About Ecofeminism" Carol J Adams Website. (2015), http://caroljadams.com/about-ecofeminism/ 41 Carol Adams. "Ecofeminism and the Eating of Animals" in Hypatia vol. 6, no. 1 (Spring 1991) 125 42 Katherine MacKinnon. "Of Mice and Men" in The Feminist Care Tradition in Animal Ethics. Carol Adams & Josephine Donovan (eds). (Columbia University Press, New York. 2007) 317. 43 Although for different reasons. 44 She will also reference Reagan who does make similar arguments to Singer and has even coauthored some works with him. 45 Deane Curtin. "Compassion and Being Human." In Ecofeminism: Feminist Intersections with Other Animals and the Earth, ed. Carol Adams and Lori Gruen (New York: Bloomsburg Publishing Inc, 2014) 54 Dean 17 are valuable in their own right, rather they are valuable because on a utilitarian view, they are in some way like us and can suffer much like we do. Therefore, we should eliminate this suffering. On this view, there are many other entities that Singer does not allot moral consideration but an ecofeminist ethic of care would. For example, an ecofeminist ethic takes into consideration the domination of nature as a whole by patriarchal capitalist society. By this, rivers, mountains, trees, and water ways have standing and are important for an interconnected web that unites all life. It seems that by Singer's argument, a very narrow picture is painted of who/what is deserving of moral consideration and if an entity cannot suffer (perhaps in the way that a human-centered view may expect) then talking about their moral standing is not necessary. Similarly, Deane Curtin argues that approaches to animal rights that take only a rights based approach depend on a sort of likeness among humans and nonhuman animals. I maintain that this is the "like-us" approach that I am speaking to. Although Singer argues against equal rights for animals and humans, I think that the approach he chooses which uses the ability to suffer as criteria for moral consideration makes a similar type of move. Curtin argues that "many of the interests an ecological ethic may have rest precisely on the differences between humans and other animals."46 Since ecofeminism in concerned with links among oppression that connect feminist and ecological interests, then holding that animals have standing by resembling humans in some way goes against these beliefs. An ecofeminist ethic understands that every individual member of the world has specific interests, and experiences without having to resemble one an other in any way. Just as the feminist movement of intersectionality seeks to highlight 46 Deane Curtin. "Toward an Ecological Ethic of Care" in The Feminist Care Tradition in Animal Ethics. (ed) Carol Adams and Josephine Donovan. (New York: Columbia University Press. 2007) 90. Dean 18 interlocking forms of oppression, ecofeminism seeks to understand links among different types of oppression.47 Curtin essentially claims If ecofeminism is to make the claim that there are important conceptual connections between ecology and feminism, it should question whether a feminist ecological ethic is best expressed through the extension of rights to nonhuman animals on the basis of their partial identity to human beings.48 To inscribe my own insights into Curtin's proposal, I would answer "no". I worry about the extension of rights based on any kind of likeness because such a view leaves out the underlying importance that difference has to offer. Further, perhaps some may argue that it is the natural human urge to find similarities in us in an effort to attribute value. I tend to agree with this view thus acknowledging why a new ethic of difference is needed. Although in some cases, placing focus among the similarities between humans and animals can be useful, I am weary of a view that may potentially leave those entities who are entirely different from us out of the equation. In a New York Times article, leading primatologist, Frans de Waal reflects upon his experiences in tickling apes. He considers the behavior of a young Chimpanzee as mirroring the behavior of a young child; both have the same sensitive "tickle spots" and antagonize their playmate for more tickling as soon as it stops.49 Further, De Waal considers other entities that show more similarities than differences with humans and although scientifically we may avoid language charged with anthropomorphic tendencies; sometimes such language is spot on. A chart discusses values we typically ascribe only to humans such as tool use or self recognition and explains that animals such as monkeys, 47 Carol Adams & Lori Gruen. "Groundwork" in Ecofeminism: Feminist Intersections with Other Animals & the Earth, ed. Carol Adams and Lori Gruen (New York: Bloomsburg Publishing Inc, 2014) 7 48 Curtin "Toward an Ecological Ethic of Care" 91. 49 Frans de Waal. "What I Learned From Tickling Apes." New York Times, April 8, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/10/opinion/sunday/what-i-learned-from-tickling-apes.html?smid=fb-share Dean 19 dolphins, crows, and even paper wasps exemplify such qualities.50 However De Wall remarks that unwarranted anthropomorphism is generally not helpful.51 Although I do agree with De Waal that some similarities are monumental and should not be overlooked; I do not think they should be the "crown jewel" upon which we allot moral consideration. Additionally, I agree that unwarranted anthropomorphism commits a "like-us" approach. As I stated earlier with reference to difference; it seems generally accepted that we should extend moral consideration to those who seem like us; but what about the animals who are very different than us? Further, I am worried about an approach that only focuses on similarities, because it may fail to capture the importance of experiences of those entities who are very different than us. This relates to my critique of Singer because I see his focus on suffering as being highly anthropomorphic. As humans, we have a specific sense by which we understand suffering and although it may be the case that animals suffer too, we do not necessarily know the phenomenal aspects of such suffering. Additionally, the "like-us" argument seems to overlook much of the importance an ecofeminist ethic of care tends to places on domination of nature (including animals) as a whole. For example, I have friends who do not adopt a vegetarian diet yet refrain from eating animals such as pigs, turkeys, and octopi, because "they are intelligent; eating them is morally wrong". I think what is at play here is an even deeper point. Perhaps it is more like this; "this animal is intelligent and is thus, like me" "I cannot eat something that is like me". This is the same move I take Singer to be making with regard to suffering. But what is to stop us from showing the same sort of consideration to animals like chickens, or tuna, or bees or entities like bivalves who are so far separated from any human similarities? In fact, in early versions of Animal Liberation Singer 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid. Dean 20 does not condemn the eating of bivalves like oysters. He considers that they do not have a central nervous system and thus, it is possible that they may not have the capacity to suffer. Although in recent editions Singer has changed his stance, stating that he is unsure if these animals do/do not feel pain, he still holds the belief that it is not ethically wrong to eat oysters.52 This seems contrary to the ecofeminist belief that would consider consumption of such animals as domination. Carol Adams expresses such an insight with regard to consuming beef. In eating a hamburger she recalled that she would not want to ingest her beloved horse; so why would she eat another animal?53 Each animal has its own way of orienting itself to a world that may be entirely inaccessible to humans. That does not mean that we should privilege some ways of being (those that resemble humans) over those that are entirely different than us. In doing so, we are only keeping up with the hierarchy that many animals activists, including Singer, claim to be working so hard to eliminate. A Potential Reply: A potential objection to my argument comes, from Singer himself. It may be argued that my critique of Singer on the grounds that his utilitarian principles miss the goodness of difference are not entirely called for. Perhaps Singer would argue that it is wrong to critique his utilitarian aims because ultimately, he is a utilitarian philosopher. However, I see a larger critique at play here of utilitarianism itself as a moral system. Something like utilitarianism seeks to measure, against one another, different modes of suffering. It tends to look at two options, make a measurement of which would result in the least suffering, and make a coinciding judgement about which option we should morally pursue. While I understand that this seemingly produces 52 Christopher Cox. "Consider the Oyster: Why Even Strict Vegans Should Feel Comfortable Eating Oysters by the Boatload" April 7 2010 http://www.slate.com/articles/life/food/2010/04/consider_the_oyster.html 53 Adams. "Ecofeminism and the Eating of Animals" Dean 21 "the greatest good for the greatest number", something like suffering is not even commensurable and thus, cannot be measured. By my view, something like suffering requires the engagement of phenomenal experiences of pain. I do not think that human to human suffering is commensurable. Everyone experiences pain in different ways; be it physical or bodily pain, emotional pain, or a mix of the two that results from something like anxiety or depression, it is quite difficult to compare my pain to others. In attempting to do so, it seems we may get caught up in pain number scales, such as those that we encounter in medical settings where a physician may ask us to rate our pain on a scale of 1 to 10. Although this may be useful in hospital settings, how are we to know that what I rate as a 6 is not, truly, on the same level as what someone else rates as a 10. By my view, this tends to be incredibly subjective. I think attempting to compare suffering from one to another cannot be done due to the subjective nature of suffering in the first place. Further, if it can be argued that human to human suffering is incommensurable then we must, by the same principles be able to argue that human to animal suffering is incommensurable as well. Essentially, what I think Singer is up to in the animal case is ascribing to animals something that we, as humans, are familiar with; but even on this view we are making an assumption that animal suffering is commensurable to ours in the first place. Utilitarianism, which is supposed to be the best approach in considering suffering and pleasure misses so much in this very regard. If something like suffering is incommensurable then how can it even be measured? Thus, a utilitarian approach to something like animal rights ultimately misses the mark and fails on its own terms. In "The Animal that Therefore I Am", Derrida considers the suffering question in a light much different than Singer does. Providing a classic Derridian analysis to the question posed originally by Bentham "Can they suffer?" Derrida looks at the linguistic paradox within such a Dean 22 question. Derrida seems to like this question because unlike other questions typically posed with regard to animal rights (ie. Aristotle's logos) this question seems to have a horizon. To Derrida "Can They Suffer?" Contains within it both a sense of ability and inability. "Can" is a question of ability, but asking "can they suffer" amounts to asking the ability of an inability. Derrida claims 'Can They Suffer?' Amounts to asking 'can they not be able?' And what of this inability [impouvoir]? What of the vulnerability on the basis of this inability? What is this nonpower at the heart of power? What is its quality or modality? How should one account for it? What right should be accorded it? To what extent does it concern us?54 Although Derrida likes this question of suffering albeit for different reasons than Singer, I think he would be very hesitant to make calculations or measurements upon the basis of such a question. It seems to me, that utilitarianism is caught up in these sorts of calculations. It is almost as though Singer, in weighing moral decisions, takes out a measuring stick in order to calculate the units of each option that will yield the least amount of suffering. Furthermore, I do not actually think Singer poses this question "can they suffer?". Such a question that, by Derrida's view contains within it both ability and inability is taken as a premise in many of Singers discussions. If Singer were to stop, and ask this question that Derrida sees to be so important, perhaps the true nature of suffering's incommensurability would come out in his analysis. I do not think Singer asks this question with regard to animals themselves. He tends to exemplify the many ways in which animals suffer at the hands of humans and uses this to remark that they have interests without specifically asking this question in the first place. I think this issue that Derrida is speaking to relates back to my discussion of phenomenology. If Singer fails to ask the question, in a phenomenal sense, if animals can suffer then it seems as though what he is up to is considering animals but not truly seeing them. I think 54 Jacques Derrida. "The Animal That Therefore I Am" in Animal Philosophy: Essential Readings in Continental Thought. ed. Calarco, Matthew, and Peter Atterton (London: Continuum, 2004.) 121. Dean 23 Derrida would object to such an approach because for him, this question of suffering that contains both ability and inability needs to be posed in order for our conversation to get anywhere. In failing to truly pose this question, Singer is undercutting much of the progress he is hoping to make. If we take a moment and truly consider ability the sense of being able wrapped up in a question of inability; we are required to phenomenally approach the question of suffering of animals in order to figure out if this is something we can even being to speak about in the first place.55 Conclusions: Ultimately, I assert that we need an alternative way of thinking about animal rights. Current utilitarian approaches seemingly miss the mark insofar as they commit the "like-us" problem. Rather, what is missing from the conversation is an embrace of difference that readily accepts a variety of different ways of being and is open to different perspectives. Ecofeminism gets this conversation going insofar as an ethic of care is interested in links among different forms of oppression and tends to see animals as valuable aside from their likeness to humans. Phenomenology is equally important here because it provides a framework in which we can meaningfully begin to talk about difference via understanding individual experience. Humans and animals may be entirely different from one another, and that is great. Difference does not necessitate hierarchical treatment but rather, opens up a variety of potential ways of being and orienting oneself to the world. 55 Recall my discussion of Nagel's "What is it like to be a bat?". Perhaps on this view, animal suffering is entirely inaccessible to a human subject. I can think of what it may be like for an animal, for instance a cow, to suffer; but this boils down to me considering what it would be like for me, as a cow, to suffer. In such a situation we are not fully taking off our "anthropocentric goggles"; only disguising them. In even expecting that animal suffering can be understood by us we are in a sense committing the "like-us' problem. Dean 24 In this paper, I have offered a three-tired argument that has both a critical and a positive edge. By working through phenomenology, difference and ecofeminism I have shown why animal lives do not need to be held in comparison to humans lives at all. Difference does not necessitate hierarchical treatment and in fact, can be a good thing. Essentially, when we consider the entities that comprise our moral communities, we have a moral obligation to appeal to difference. As stated previously, this conversation has a sense of urgency. In a world of human mastery over nature, we should consider some of the things that have justified this treatment, namely difference. If we take up an approach to animal rights that instead, embraces difference then such a hierarchy can be eliminated. My argument begins to necessitate this alternative approach but we still have a long way to go in applying such an approach to our moral communities. However, I am confident that an ethic appealing to difference can take this very conversation to the next level and potentially rid of the "like-us" problem altogether. Dean 25 Bibliography Adams, Carol. "About Ecofeminism" Carol J Adams Website. (2015), http://caroljadams.com/about-ecofeminism/ --- "Ecofeminism and the Eating of Animals" in Hypatia vol. 6, no. 1 (Spring 1991) Adams, Carol and Lori Gruen. "Groundwork" in Ecofeminism: Feminist Intersections with Other Animals & the Earth, ed. Carol Adams and Lori Gruen New York: Bloomsburg Publishing Inc, 2014 Cox, Christopher. "Consider the Oyster: Why Even Strict Vegans Should Feel Comfortable Eating Oysters by the Boatload" April 7 2010 http://www.slate.com/articles/life/food/2010/04/consider_the_oyster.html Curtin, Deane. "Compassion and Being Human." In Ecofeminism: Feminist Intersections with Other Animals and the Earth, ed. Carol Adams and Lori Gruen New York: Bloomsburg Publishing Inc, 2014 --- "Toward an Ecological Ethic of Care" in The Feminist Care Tradition in Animal Ethics. (ed) Carol Adams and Josephine Donovan. New York: Columbia University Press 2007. Derrida, Jacques. "Différance" in The Continental Philosophy Reader, edited by Richard Kearney and Mara Rainwater. Routledge, 1996. --- "The Animal That Therefore I Am" in Animal Philosophy: Essential Readings in Continental Thought. ed. Calarco, Matthew, and Peter Atterton. London: Continuum, 2004. de Waal, Frans. "What I Learned From Tickling Apes." New York Times, April 8, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/10/opinion/sunday/what-i-learned-from-tickling-apes.html?smid=fb-share Dean 26 Ellis, Erle. "Anthropocene," ed. Jay Gulledge. September 3, 2013. http://www.eoearth.org/view/article/150125 Hall, Melinda. "Notes on Jacques Derrida." Stetson University: DeLand, 2015. Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. New York: Harper, 1962. --- "The Animal is Poor in the World" in Animal Philosophy: Essential Readings in Continental Thought. ed. Calarco, Matthew, and Peter Atterton. London: Continuum, 2004. --- "The Question Concerning Technology" from Basic Writings, rev. Edu. New York, HarperCollins [1993] 2008. Langer, Monika M., and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception: A Guide and Commentary. Tallahassee: Florida State University Press, 1989. Lévinas, Emmanuel. "The Face" in Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo, trans. Richard A. Cohen, 1985. --- "The Face of the Other" Totality and Infinity; an Essay on Exteriority. Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1969. --- "The Name of a Dog, or Natural Rights" in Animal Philosophy: Essential Readings in Continental Thought. ed. Calarco, Matthew, and Peter Atterton. London: Continuum, 2004. Mackinnon, Katherine. "Of Mice and Men" in The Feminist Care Tradition in Animal Ethics. Carol Adams & Josephine Donovan (eds). Columbia University Press, New York. 2007. Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 2003. Nature: Course Notes from the College de France. Northwestern University Press. Dean 27 Nagel, Thomas. "What is it like to be a bat?" In Mortal Questions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979. Oliver, Kelly. "Strange Kinship: Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty on Animals" In Animal Lessons: How They Teach us to be Human. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009. Quinn, Daniel. Ishmael. New York: Bantam/Turner Books, 1995. Singer, Peter. "All Animals are Equal" in Writings on an Ethical Life. New York: Ecco Press, 2000. Toadvine, Ted. "How Not to be a Jellyfish" In Christian Lotz & Corinne Painter (ed). Phenomenology and the Non-Human Animal. Springer 39-55 (2007) Dean 28 Acknowledgments Thank you to my thesis advisor Dr. Melinda Hall for her support, assistance, and guidance in writing this paper. I also wish to thank Dr. Joshua Rust and the students in his Research in Philosophy Course: Jason Cruz, Enric Cordoba, Olivia Haskin, Amanda Hernandez, and Joshua Resnick, whose comments on a version of this paper were very helpful.